

# **A PEOPLE'S PEACE IN CYPRUS**

## **TESTING PUBLIC OPINION ON THE OPTIONS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT**

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The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) is an independent policy research institute based in Brussels. Its mission is to produce sound analytical research leading to constructive solutions to the challenges facing Europe today. CEPS Paperbacks present analysis and views by leading experts on important questions in the arena of European public policy, written in a style geared to an informed but generalist readership. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors writing in a personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect those of CEPS or any other institution with which the authors are associated.

This study was carried out in the context of the broader work programme of CEPS on EU Foreign, Security and Neighbourhood Policies, which is generously supported by the Compagnia di San Paolo and the Open Society Institute. It reports and analyses the results of the second in a series of public opinion surveys in Cyprus. The first stage and poll was conducted simultaneously in the northern and southern parts of the island in March-April 2008, and its results were published in the first book in this series:

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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The year 2009 is decisive for the protracted Cyprus conflict. Incentives for a settlement might be higher and above all more evenly distributed among all parties than in 2004, when the Annan Plan failed due to an overwhelming Greek Cypriot rejection of the proposed blueprint despite Turkish Cypriot acceptance of the plan. Yet while strategic assessments and elite incentives bode cautiously well for a Cyprus settlement, ultimately an agreement will have to be approved by the two Cypriot communities in referendums and above all it will have to be implemented by the Cypriots on the ground. In other words, ordinary Cypriots lie at the crux of the conflict settlement as well as the drawn-out conflict resolution process, determining the ultimate success or failure of any blueprint signed by their leaders.

In view of the centrality of the people in this peace process, the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in collaboration with Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot partners, launched a project in late 2007 to investigate, through successive opinion polls, what Cypriots think of each other, of the peace process and of possible solutions to the conflict. The project has developed in two distinct stages. The first stage and poll was conducted simultaneously in the northern and southern parts of the island in March-April 2008 and its results were published in the first book in this series: Erol Kaymak, Alexandros Lordos and Nathalie Tocci, *Building Confidence in Peace – Public Opinion and the Cyprus Peace Process*, CEPS, October 2008. On the basis of the first survey and book, the authors proceeded to the second stage of the project, zooming in on the details of a final settlement. The second survey was also conducted simultaneously in the southern and northern parts of the island, this time in January and early February 2009 and its results are presented here. The questions put in the first questionnaire were deliberately broad and general. In this second survey, the authors unpacked the different components and options of the

thorniest dossiers on the conflict settlement agenda. The question underpinning this second survey and book is the extent to which Cypriots converge more once we leave the abstract level of labels and slogans and enter into the specifics of a package deal. It is often claimed that ‘the devil is in the detail’. Does this apply to Cyprus, or is a different and thus far more promising tendency at work on the island?

The survey results show that by delving into the details of a Cyprus settlement, agreement is possible but it will be a hard sell to the people of both communities. What matters above all and more than the positions adopted by the leaders, political parties or external actors in and surrounding the Cyprus conflict is the substance of the proposed deal itself, with core issues of concern being, above all: security, property, governance, rights and freedoms, territory and ‘settlers’.

## **Security**

Any agreement on security that could garner the support of both communities would have to reconcile Greek Cypriot opposition regarding Turkish military intervention and Turkish Cypriot desires that Turkey remain a credible guarantor. Given bizonality and other facts related to any ‘new state of affairs’ the extant Treaty of Guarantee would require amendment, as was the case when the Annan Plan blueprint called for additional protocols. Amending the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, however, runs a risk of not overcoming Greek Cypriots’ negative perceptions regarding the specific document, as evidenced in the current poll; with this in mind, an amended or new treaty could be designed in such a way as to also be acceptable to Turkish Cypriots, thus serving as the basis of a new security regime in Cyprus.

While negotiating and designing the future security and treaty architecture of a unified Cyprus is a delicate matter, which will require the creativity and high level commitment of all relevant parties both in Cyprus and internationally, public opinion on the ground does seem to suggest specific elements that could be considered further by the formal negotiators. For one, the treaty – whatever it is called – could ‘unpack’ the security and implementation challenges that a unified Cyprus may face in the future, differentiating between potential military threats, governance crises and instances of non-implementation of the agreement; defining for each a differentiated response mechanism that could, as needed in each case, involve the federal and constituent state governments in Cyprus, the

governments of Greece and Turkey, the EU and the UN. Authorisation for action in cases of non-implementation remains problematic, since there is divergence both on the issue of unilateral intervention rights as well as on whether the UN could also serve as enforcer in the case of non-implementation. In this regard further research is called for, exploring alternative consensus models and suggesting ways in which future disagreements between the treaty signatories could be resolved.

Whatever the particular variation, the key point is that a new security regime serves as a potential point of convergence that could be potentially promoted by political leaders as a viable alternative to the status quo. This could also be combined with the creation of a bicommunal force, which together with Greek and Turkish troops would participate in UN peacekeeping and possibly ESDP missions abroad, as well as a renewed mandate for UNFICYP to monitor the implementation of the agreement on the ground.

### **Property**

Bicommunal consensus could also be reached on the property dossier with the breakdown of properties into different categories. The order of priority deciding whether a property would be returned (as preferred by the Greek Cypriots) or compensated for (as preferred by the Turkish Cypriots) would vary between categories of property. Specifically, the poll results suggest that original owners could have priority in a subset of cases concerning unused properties and properties used by 'settlers' or other non-Cypriots, while current users could have priority in the cases of properties on which public utilities have been built, or that are being used for income generation, or that have been significantly improved and built upon. The most complex case to resolve is that of properties that are now being used by displaced persons from the other community as primary residences. For these types of properties, it is envisioned that a specific set of criteria be used to decide on who would have priority, though a give-and-take solution can also be envisioned whereby priority for properties used by displaced persons remains with current users, while priority for religious heritage sites, similarly controversial, is granted to original owners. More broadly, where properties are compensated for rather than returned, a mix of different compensation schemes could be foreseen, including compensation in cash, and compensation with other properties of equivalent value, ideally avoiding the option of government bonds, for which the Greek Cypriots have little enthusiasm.

## **Governance**

On the issue of governance it was also possible to register possible convergence around the setting-up of a rotating presidency/vice presidency (according to set time periods) elected on separate tickets with an element of cross-voting. Under such a model the presidential team would nominate a council of ministers responsible for those ministries under federal or mixed competences. The question of representation ratios within federal offices would remain and require compromise, possibly by opting for a mix of 75-25, 60-40 and 50-50 depending on the specific staffing requirements and other ministry or federal office sensitivities, thus de-politicising and de-polarising the issue of ratios. In the case of the council of ministers, ratios could include a 2:1 configuration in terms of the communal origin of participants, which is considered 'reasonable and fair' by Greek Cypriots, but a 50-50 ratio in terms of the right of each of the two leaders to nominate members to the council of ministers from both communities, which is considered 'reasonable and fair' by Turkish Cypriots. A complementary approach to resolving the issue of ratios involves establishing a trade-off between competences and ratios: the stronger the federal government would be in relation to the constituent states, the more equality in representation would be envisioned; and vice-versa.

## **Rights and Freedoms**

Compromise is also possible on the question of rights and freedoms, with Turkish Cypriots willing to extend a general set of rights and freedoms to all citizens throughout the island with the qualified extension of voting, property and business establishment rights. This finding reflects how the Turkish Cypriot attachment to bizonality is anchored above all in the fear of being dominated both politically and economically by the Greek Cypriots, while at the same time they maintain openness towards the principle of coexistence of the two communities and the creation of a multicultural society.

## **Territory and 'Settlers'**

Major divergences lie instead in the territory and 'settlers' dossiers, which may call for 'give and take' between these two dossiers. Territorial readjustments will inevitably be a major area of Turkish Cypriot concession, but the blow may be softened by including federal areas (of which some would be in what is now Greek Cypriot territory) in the new



map of Cyprus. As far as immigrants from Turkey are concerned, differences may well have to be split down the middle, while at the same time Greek Cypriot anxieties over immigration and the potential for racism and xenophobia would need to be tackled urgently through a 'multi-cultural education drive'.

Selling a Cyprus settlement to both communities on the island in separate referendums will no doubt be a tough challenge. Yet what this project, with its two surveys and books, has attempted to demonstrate is that a people's peace in Cyprus *is* possible. Particularly when delving into the details of a future plan, including the thorniest issues of the Cyprus settlement, the authors found that not only is a compromise feasible, but above all, by probing what citizens think, fear and desire, that new and creative ideas may be put to the service of the overall peace process on the island.



## 1. Introduction

Incentives for a settlement in 2009 may be higher and above all more evenly distributed among all parties than in 2004, when the Annan Plan failed. The current Greek Cypriot leadership seems conscious of the fact that time is not on its side. Back in 2004 the expectation, fed by the former leadership, was that through the leverage gained from EU membership, the Republic of Cyprus would be able to extract new and significant concessions from the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. True, Cyprus' EU membership has been consistently used and abused as a source of pressure on Turkey; but in many ways developments on the ground have consolidated the partition on the island. The international reputation of the Turkish Cypriots has changed and improved. While this change in international perceptions has not brought with it the longed-for lifting of the international isolation of northern Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey are no longer viewed as the indisputable *bête noire* of the Cyprus quagmire.<sup>1</sup> Despite its failure, the momentum generated and the expectations raised by the Annan Plan and EU accession created new dynamics in the property realm and consequently triggered an economic boom in the north, which, while unsustainable,<sup>2</sup> has visibly changed the economic outlook of Turkish Cypriots. Adding to the pressure, despite the vocal Greek Cypriot resistance to a timetable, political realities related both to the internal dynamics of the Turkish Cypriot community and to Turkey's EU accession process seem to suggest that the end of 2009 might be a 'de facto deadline' for the peace process.

Turning north, Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat, elected president in February 2005, had ridden on the pro-solution wave that

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<sup>1</sup> Throughout the 1990s and until the 2003 change of Turkish Cypriot leadership, the Turkish side was widely considered by the international community as resisting the prospect of a federal settlement in Cyprus, promoting instead a confederal solution or alternatively the international recognition of the breakaway Turkish Cypriot state in the northern part of Cyprus.

<sup>2</sup> In fact, the widely publicised 'Orams Case' and other such lawsuits that Greek Cypriots are filing, have increased the risks inherent in purchasing properties from Turkish Cypriots in the north that were originally owned by displaced Greek Cypriots. As a result, by 2008 demand for properties in the north had dampened, a situation now further exacerbated by the global credit crisis and concomitant recession.

swept across the north in the final years of the Annan Plan process in 2003-4. Talat faces elections in early 2010 and so far has little to show to his pro-resolution constituency. Moreover, despite the re-launch of the peace process in September 2008, the mood in the north has palpably changed and hardened, as evidenced by the strong showing of the Nationalist Union Party (UBP) in polls in the run up to the April 2009 parliamentary elections.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, the polls conducted for the purposes of this book are in congruence with this trend, demonstrating a shift towards the UBP, with significant numbers of former CTP voters declaring their intent not to cast a vote or to repatriate to the UBP. Hence the urgency of a solution among the Turkish Cypriots, acutely felt by their leader, Mr. Talat, who has already indicated that he may not stand for re-election if there is no solution by the end of 2009, explaining that '[i]f there is no hope for a resolution by [year-end], I will have completed my mission.'<sup>4</sup>

Stakes are high for Turkey as well. Over the last four years, Cyprus has poisoned EU-Turkey relations, partly due to the direct actions of member state Cyprus and largely because other member states have supported or hidden behind the Cyprus issue to block or slow-down Turkey's accession course. In the autumn of 2009, the European Council is scheduled to review Turkey's accession process in relation to Turkey's (non)implementation of the Additional Protocol extending the EU-Turkey customs union to Cyprus. In addition, Turkey's accession negotiations, which are currently proceeding at snail's pace, risk grinding to a halt by the end of the year in view of the chapters directly or indirectly blocked by the Cyprus conflict. Enthusiasm for EU membership amongst Turkish stakeholders and the public alike has waned, but it is unlikely that any mainstream actor in Turkey, regardless of how nationalist or eurosceptic, desires the process to be completely derailed.<sup>5</sup> Equally concerned about a

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<sup>3</sup> A poll conducted by KADEM released in March 2009 revealed that the main opposition party, the National Unity Party (UBP), enjoys a clear lead over the incumbent Republican Turkish Party (CTP), <http://www.kibrisgazetesi.com/index.php/cat/2/news/67507/PageName/Ic-Haberler>.

<sup>4</sup> J. Christou (2009), "Talat to Stand Down if No Solution Found", *Cyprus Mail*, 8 March 2009.

<sup>5</sup> A. Toksabay Esen & H. Tolga Bölükbaşı (2008) 'Attitudes of Key Stakeholders in Turkey towards EU-Turkey Relations: Consensual Discord or Contentious Accord?', in

drastic derailment in EU-Turkey relations is Greece, where government and opposition alike have reoriented their foreign policy vision basing it on Turkey's EU accession and its parallel domestic transformation.

Strategic assessments and elite incentive structures thus bode cautiously well for a Cyprus settlement. But ultimately an agreement, if reached, will have to be approved by the two Cypriot communities in referendums and above all it will have to be implemented by Cypriots on the ground in the years to come. In other words, ordinary Cypriots lie at the crux of the conflict settlement as well as the drawn-out conflict resolution and transformation process, determining the ultimate success or failure of any blueprint signed by their leaders.

The project to investigate what Cypriots think of each other, of the peace process and of possible solutions to the conflict has developed in two distinct stages. The first stage and poll was conducted simultaneously in the northern and southern parts of the island in March-April 2008, the objective of which was to explore and suggest ways in which the leaderships in Cyprus and the EU could raise public confidence in and offer incentives for peace on the island. One of the principal findings of this study was that Cypriots share a high degree of mistrust towards each other and towards the peace process. In view of this, we highlighted mutually acceptable confidence building steps that could be pursued alongside negotiations on a comprehensive settlement in order to maximize the peace process' chances of success.

On the basis of our first survey and book, we proceeded to the second stage of our project, zooming in on the details of a final settlement. Our second survey was conducted simultaneously in the southern and northern parts of the island in January and early February 2009 and its results are presented here.<sup>6</sup> In this second survey we have set aside those issues that

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N. Tocci (ed.) *Talking Turkey in Europe: Towards a Differentiated Communication Strategy*, IAI Quaderni: Rome.

<sup>6</sup> Two identical polls were conducted, in the north and south, by Prologue Consulting Ltd. and CYMAR, respectively. For each poll, 1000 interviews were conducted. Respondents were selected initially through stratification of urban and rural populations based on census data. Details of the sampling process can be found in Annex 1. The questionnaire was produced by CEPS in collaboration with a research team comprised of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and was fine-tuned through the input of a selected group of official and non-official Greek Cypriot, Turkish

emerged as relatively uncontroversial from our first survey, namely the economic and international outlook in Cyprus. On these issues our first survey found that both communities agree on bridging the economic divide between the two communities through a carefully planned development strategy foreseeing gradual economic integration and joint ventures, as well as temporary restrictions to economic freedoms, the protection of vulnerable groups and a significant input by the international community. Regarding Cyprus' foreign policy outlook both communities concurred that Cyprus, alongside Greece and Turkey and within an EU context, would actively seek to project peace, stability and prosperity to its wider neighbourhood, would enjoy sovereign equality vis-à-vis Greece and Turkey, and would actively support Turkey's EU membership bid.

On other issues, however, results were not so promising. We detected significant distance and polarisation on the questions of governance, property, rights and freedoms, security and 'settlers' in particular. The questions we put in our first questionnaire were deliberately broad and general. In this second survey we unpacked and specified in greater detail the different components and options regarding the principal and thorniest dossiers on the conflict settlement agenda. The underlying question or hypothesis underpinning this second survey and book is the extent to which Cypriots converge more once we enter into the specifics of a package deal. The aim of this second survey and book is therefore to explore not just whether Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots want a settlement on the island, but above all what kind of solution they desire and would accept. What is the peace that Cypriots want and thus the peace that leaders might expect the wider public to ratify and subsequently live with, cherish and nurture in the years and decades to come?

## **2. Hopes, Expectations and Priorities in the Peace Process**

We began our investigation by enquiring whether Cypriots expect and want a settlement on the island. Beginning with expectations, both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, reconfirming the results from our first survey, are pessimistic about the current negotiations, with majorities on both sides (56% of the Greek Cypriots and 61% of the Turkish Cypriots)

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Cypriot, Turkish, Greek and international interlocutors. The questionnaire is reproduced here in Annex 2.

giving a poor prognosis on the issue of whether the peace process will deliver an agreement (see Figure 1). It should be noted however that the response of the public to this question is not necessarily a fair indicator of whether there is public interest in or commitment to achieving a settlement. The responses to such questions, asked frequently by pollsters, often make it to the headlines of daily newspapers with the subtext “gloom and doom in Cyprus”. In view of this situation, we decided to ask not just whether people are hopeful that the process will produce results, but whether they wish the process to produce results. Very encouragingly, both communities unambiguously want the process to succeed, with 64% of the Greek Cypriots and 65% of the Turkish Cypriots desiring a mutually acceptable settlement to emerge from the peace process (see Figure 2). This is often overlooked in surveys and the media, which only ask and report about levels of expectation and therefore reach the false conclusion that the public has given up on and/or does not care about the peace process.

*Figure 1. To what extent are you hopeful that the peace process will produce results?*





Figure 2. To what extent do you wish – and expect from the leaders – that they reach a mutually acceptable settlement through the peace process?



The desire for success of the peace process links back to the results of our first survey regarding the level of (dis)satisfaction with the status quo. In that poll we found that 84% of Turkish Cypriots and 75% of Greek Cypriots were either dissatisfied or had mixed feelings about the status quo. In this survey this perceived dissatisfaction, albeit with an interesting role reversal between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, was reconfirmed: 67% of the Turkish Cypriots and 90% of the Greek Cypriots either reject or find the status quo merely tolerable (see Figures 4a and 5a). While to different and changing degrees, both communities in Cyprus thus share a sense of scepticism about the peace process as well as a resolute desire for these negotiations to succeed, not least in view of their dissatisfaction with the current situation on the island.



Figure 4a. Regarding the overall framework of a Comprehensive Settlement, and considering each of the alternative settlement models presented here, how acceptable or unacceptable, in principle, do you consider each of these models? (Greek Cypriot self-perceptions)







Figure 5a. Regarding the overall framework of a Comprehensive Settlement, and considering each of the alternative settlement models presented here, how acceptable or unacceptable, in principle, do you consider each of these models? (Turkish Cypriot self-perceptions)



*Figure 4b. How acceptable or unacceptable do you think each of these models is for the majority of the other community? (Turkish Cypriot perceptions of Greek Cypriot community)*



*Figure 5b. How acceptable or unacceptable do you think each of these models is for the majority of the other community? (Greek Cypriot perceptions of Turkish Cypriot community)*



Delving deeper into this question, we enquired into the reasons why Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots want a solution. What are their priorities and motives for wanting the peace process to succeed? As far as the Greek Cypriots are concerned, the results are clear-cut and unequivocal. Greek Cypriots care above all about security, with the desire to end the perceived threat emanating from Turkey ranking as the number one motive for solving the conflict (81%), followed by “achieving a just resolution of the property issue” (63%), “living within a functional, democratic and internationally respected state” (63%), “being able to live and work anywhere in Cyprus” (54%) and finally the issue of territory (50%). Greek Cypriots are significantly less concerned with issues such as power-sharing or with benefits they already enjoy (e.g., EU membership). This can be interpreted as an intense focus on and concern for what Greek Cypriots view as the ‘core issues’ of a settlement – security, property, functionality, human rights, territory – which drown out most other responses given when participants had to choose their five preferred options. Turkish Cypriots, by contrast, do not display similar peaks and troughs in motivations and priorities, with reasons to reach a settlement being spread more evenly across different options. This said, we find that improving the economic situation scores highest (70%), preserving cultural identity (54%), the independence, functionality and democratic nature of governance (53%), and securing basic freedoms and EU membership (48% each). Mutatis mutandis, a more evenly spread Turkish Cypriot prioritisation of motives for change is reminiscent of the results of our first survey, which found that Turkish Cypriots are more ‘transformationist’ than Greek Cypriots, in so far as they desire change in a diverse set of features within their society.<sup>7</sup>

Summing up, security and property can be seen as ‘common core issues’, that are of strong concern to both communities, whereas territory is

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
<sup>7</sup> “As a visible effect of different contextual circumstances, Turkish Cypriots appear to be more transformationist, i.e., willing to change a diverse set of features within their society, valuing almost equally order (59%), democracy (51%), fighting inflation (41%) and freedom of speech (45%). By contrast, Greek Cypriots appear to care more for current problem areas within their society such as maintaining order (71%), fighting crime (62%) and fighting inflation (59%), as opposed to areas they feel relatively content with (e.g., democracy 33% and freedom of speech 34%)”. See Kaymak, Lordos & Tocci (2008), *Building Confidence in Peace: Public Opinion and the Cyprus Peace Process*, CEPS, Brussels, pp. 18-19.

of more concern to the Greek Cypriots and the economy is of more concern to the Turkish Cypriots. An implication here is that in areas of clear divergence where win-win agreements are difficult to reach, package compromises could be made based on the issues of prime interest to the two communities. A worrying finding however is that both communities rate “returning to a constitutional order where the two communities share power” as bottom on their list of priorities (10% of the Greek Cypriots and 24% of the Turkish Cypriots). On the one hand this is natural, given that power-sharing is a necessary outcome of a compromise rather than a motive for a settlement per se. Furthermore, the specific wording “returning to a constitutional order” may have been interpreted as a return to the 1960 set-up, on which neither side is particularly keen. On the other hand, it is a cause for concern if the two communities do not put their hearts into the power-sharing process and focus instead on what they each separately have to gain from an agreement (see Figure 3).

While not viewing power-sharing as a prime motive for a solution, a power-sharing agreement based on a bizonal and bicomunal federation (BBF) was however reconfirmed in this second survey as the only possible compromise solution. As in our first poll, we found huge divergence on the options of a unitary state (with 80% of Greek Cypriots in favour but 67% of Turkish Cypriots either rejecting or viewing this as merely tolerable), two separate states (with 71% of Turkish Cypriots in favour but 91% of Greek Cypriots rejecting or viewing this as merely tolerable) and a confederation (with 39% of Turkish Cypriots in favour but 92% of Greek Cypriots rejecting or finding this as merely tolerable).

Additionally, there is divergence in each community’s perceptions of the other community’s preferences: Turkish Cypriots mistakenly believe that Greek Cypriots prefer the persistence of the status quo (when asked “how acceptable or unacceptable do you believe the Greek Cypriots would consider each type of solution”, Turkish Cypriots respond that the first option for Greek Cypriots is the continuation of the status quo, the second option is a unitary state while federation is merely their third option – whereas in fact Greek Cypriots report that their first option is a unitary state, their second and also acceptable option is a federation, while continuation of the status quo ranks a distant third). Greek Cypriots mistakenly think that Turkish Cypriots are open to consider a unitary state (Turkish Cypriots rank a unitary state as their worst option, even below continuation of the status quo, whereas Greek Cypriots think that it ranks second after a two state solution and preferable to a federal solution).

Figure 3. Of these possible motives for solving the Cyprus Problem, which five are most important to you?



These misperceptions are symptomatic of the poor communication and low levels of understanding and trust between the two communities. Turkish Cypriots believe Greek Cypriots prefer the status quo to a federation due to the 2004 rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek Cypriots: if the Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan, the reasoning goes, and given that the Annan Plan was an adequate federal blueprint, then the Greek Cypriots reject a federal settlement. Although the Greek Cypriots have been protesting since 2004 that their rejection of the Annan Plan was related to specific aspects of the plan and not to its federal nature, these explanations have fallen on deaf ears among the Turkish Cypriots, where the belief persists that what Greek Cypriots reject is the concept of a bizonal bicomunal federation. The Greek Cypriot misrepresentation of Turkish Cypriot priorities is quite different in its origin but also very revealing: the notion that Turkish Cypriots would accept a unitary state is related to a narrative whereby ‘it is Ankara that demands a bizonal settlement because this would further its strategic interests, whereas the Turkish Cypriots in reality would prefer a unitary state just like the Greek Cypriots’. Thus, based on this narrative, the Turkish Cypriot desire to enjoy substantial autonomy and self-rule in the context of a bizonal bicomunal federation is overlooked by the Greek Cypriot community, in a manner that Turkish Cypriots tend to find condescending and bothersome.

Moving beyond these misunderstandings, the one and only real option of convergence is that of a bizonal and bicomunal federation with 81% of Greek Cypriots and 74% of Turkish Cypriots finding a BBF satisfactory or tolerable – despite perceptions to the contrary! (See Figures 4 and 5). These results are consistent with those from our first survey, where the reworded option “bizonal bicomunal federation with political equality” gained the support of 75% of Greek Cypriots and 90% of Turkish Cypriots.<sup>8</sup>

### **3. Towards a Future Referendum**

Having ascertained the motives and scope for a compromise agreement, we turn to the key question of a future vote in a referendum. Here the results are alarming: a referendum on both sides will be a tough sell, with 34% of

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<sup>8</sup> The addition of the term “with political equality” explains the relatively higher level of support of the Turkish Cypriots and the relatively lower level of support of the Greek Cypriots to this option in the first survey. However, under both specifications of a BBF, significant majorities within the two communities are in favour.

Greek Cypriots and 37% of Turkish Cypriots definitely or leaning towards a “no”; a mere 23% of Greek Cypriots and 41% of Turkish Cypriots definitely or leaning towards a “yes”, and with the Greek Cypriots in particular displaying high levels of undecided voters (44%) (see Figures 6 and 7). In both communities undecided swing voters will determine the referendum results, and, as opposed to 2004, we are unlikely to witness an overwhelming wave of Turkish Cypriot support for a future plan, as evidenced by numerous polls. In our first survey the Annan Plan proved not only unpopular among Greek Cypriots (who had rejected it in 2004), but was almost equally among Turkish Cypriots.<sup>9</sup> Corroborating this data, a recent poll by KADEM asked Turkish Cypriot respondents how they would vote for the Annan Plan if the 2004 referendum were repeated in 2009. Almost 54% declared that they would vote “no”.<sup>10</sup> While it is not the Annan Plan that will be put to a referendum at the end of the current peace process, but rather a new plan based on the current negotiations between Mr Christofias and Mr Talat, the fact that the Annan Plan gets such a poor showing in polls attests to the fact that the mood among Turkish Cypriots has shifted in a negative direction, a fact that will, *mutatis mutandis*, make any future referendum campaign more challenging than the equivalent 2004 campaign.

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<sup>9</sup> Kaymak, Lordos & Tocci (2008), *op. cit.*, pp. 30-31.

<sup>10</sup> See the 5 March 2009 edition of Kibris newspaper, <http://www.kibrisgazetesi.com/index.php/cat/2/news/67584/PageName/Ic-Haberler>. The significant divergence between our poll's findings and the KADEM poll might be related to the methodology underlying the wording of the question in each case. First, it should be noted that in our case we did not ask about “how they would vote if the Annan Plan was put to referendum” but rather “how they would vote if the negotiations conclude and a new plan is drafted”. Thus, part of the divergence can be explained as representing the hope that citizens are investing in the current process ‘for a settlement plan that is an improvement on the Annan Plan’. Additionally, for the purposes of our poll, a primary interest was to identify swing voters for the sake of further analysis and thus a specific response category “I am just as likely to vote Yes as to vote No” was presented to participants. In polls that do not present such a clearly defined intermediate category, such as the KADEM poll, but instead offer only a “Yes” or “No” response and record separately the refusal to respond, it is typical to find higher values in the “Yes” and “No” categories and much lower values in the “Undecided” category. While this may be a better way to identify hidden trends in the public mood, we felt that in our case, and given that a referendum is still a long way away, it was more important to ensure that swing voters were identified correctly, whatever their current mood.

Figure 6. Considering a hypothetical scenario where the negotiations between the two leaders conclude, a solution plan is drafted and a referendum is organised, how do you see yourself voting in such a future referendum? (Greek Cypriots)





Figure 7. Considering a hypothetical scenario where the negotiations between the two leaders conclude, a solution plan is drafted and a referendum is organised, how do you see yourself voting in such a future referendum? (Turkish Cypriots)





Returning to our findings in relation to the intended referendum vote, a demographic analysis of the responses allows various important conclusions to be drawn (see Figures 8a and 8b). First, in relation to age group, we note similarities but also differences between the two communities; in the Greek Cypriot community, older voters in the 55-64 and 65+ categories tend towards a 'Yes' vote, younger voters in the 18-24, 25-34 and 35-44 categories tend towards a 'No' vote while voters in the 45-54 categories are equally split. It should be noted of course that across all age groups the swing voter category remains the largest segment (see Figure 8a). Among the Turkish Cypriots, an intriguing situation seems to have developed whereby the middle-aged groups - 35-44 and 45-54, strongly tend towards a 'Yes', yet both the younger (18-24, 25-34) and older (55-64, 65+) groups tend more in favour of a 'No'. In other words, the generation of Turkish Cypriots that is currently in a position of authority and driving the Turkish Cypriot pro-solution policy is 'under siege' both from their children's and their parents' generations, who express strong scepticism and reservations over the pro-settlement policy that has been pursued over the last few years.

Figure 8a. Cross tabulation of intended referendum vote against age group (Greek Cypriots)





Figure 8b. Cross tabulation of intended referendum vote against age group (Turkish Cypriots)



In relation to political party affiliation, we note another interesting differentiation between the two communities. Greek Cypriots adhering to the three largest parties – DISY, AKEL and DIKO – all seem to display similar profiles when it comes to their intended vote in a future referendum, with – in each party – about 20-25% trending ‘Yes’, 20-25% trending ‘No’ and 50% being swing voters. While there is a slightly larger proportion of ‘Yes’ voters in DISY and a slightly larger proportion of ‘No’ voters in DIKO, the overall similarity is noteworthy, especially considering the differences in expressed policy positions in relation to the Cyprus conflict by the senior leaderships of these three parties. In contrast, among supporters of smaller parties such as EDEK, and among those who declare that they will put in an abstention vote, there is a very strong trend in favour of a ‘No’ vote with comparatively few swing voters.<sup>11</sup> What we see in effect is the political marginalisation of the ‘hard No’ vote, to the extent that these voters feel that they have no choice but to abstain from mainstream politics given that the major parties no longer represent them.

<sup>11</sup> In our poll, the same trend seems to apply to other small parties, such as EVROKO and the Green Party, but due to the small number of respondents hailing from those parties it is not possible to draw statistically valid inferences.

What is developing into the dominant political viewpoint instead is a 'wait and see' approach: "Let's see the results of the peace negotiations and then we will decide how to vote" (see Figure 9a). Among Turkish Cypriots, the situation is quite different since party affiliation and intended referendum vote correlate very closely: those who still support CTP are largely committed to voting 'Yes', those who support UBP are largely committed to voting 'No', though it is noteworthy that even among UBP supporters there is a 25% segment tending towards a 'Yes', while supporters of the smaller parties display intermediate positions (see Figure 9b).

*Figure 9a. Cross tabulation of intended referendum vote against political party affiliation (Greek Cypriots)*





Figure 9b. Cross tabulation of intended referendum vote against political party affiliation (Turkish Cypriots)



When relating intended referendum vote to district of residence, we see substantial differentiation in both communities. Among Greek Cypriots, Limassol and Paphos strongly tend towards a ‘No’, though the swing voter element remains strong; Nicosia, in contrast, is split three-way between the ‘Yes’ trend, the ‘No’ trend, and the swing voters. Interestingly, in both the Larnaca and Famagusta/Ammohostos districts swing vote seems to dominate by 80% and over. Residents of these districts appear to be waiting to hear ‘recommendations from the Capital’ before making up their minds (see Figure 10a). Among Turkish Cypriots we see that Nicosia/Lefkoşa slightly trends ‘Yes’, Kyrenia/Girne and Morphou/Güzelyurt slightly trend ‘No’, while Famagusta/Gazi Mağusa is equally split and highly polarised, and finally İskele (the Karpas peninsula) strongly trends ‘Yes’ - a counterintuitive finding given the high number of settlers from Turkey who are resident in that area (see Figure 10b).

Figure 10a. Cross tabulation of intended referendum vote against district of residence (Greek Cypriots)





Figure 10b. Cross tabulation of intended referendum vote against district of residence (Turkish Cypriots)



However when comparing intended referendum votes to levels of education and levels of income, a more sobering picture emerges. The 'Yes' trend seems to be driven, in both communities, by the higher socio-economic groups. In terms of education, by those holding post-graduate degrees, and in terms of income, by those families who earn more than €2,500 in the Greek Cypriot community or YTL 3,400 in the Turkish Cypriot community. An additional finding that deserves to be highlighted is that in both communities the least educated socio-economic group (up to elementary school only) displays a 'Yes' trend of a similar magnitude to that displayed by the most educated group (post-graduate degree) and in marked contrast to all the intermediate socio-economic groups that trend towards 'No' (see Figures 11a, 11b, 12a, 12b). These findings taken together are troubling, insofar as they signify a resistance to the peace process on the part of the 'middle' classes in between,<sup>12</sup> which if left unaddressed may lead to a gradual rift between the political elites and the wider population on matters related to the Cyprus conflict. In such a scenario it will be very difficult for the political leadership to successfully guide the population in a referendum. To avert such an outcome, it is important that the leaderships are seen to make an effort to engage with the public in matters relating to the Cyprus conflict, listening to the concerns of citizens and taking care to ensure that the peace process is, to the extent feasible, inclusive of grassroots views.

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<sup>12</sup> The fact that the least educated seem to be immune to this negativity seems to suggest that resistance to the peace process is culturally mediated, and specifically that both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots develop more negative attitudes as they come into contact with the mainstream media, the secondary schooling system etc.

Figure 11a. Cross tabulation of intended referendum vote against level of education (Greek Cypriots)




Figure 11b. Cross tabulation of intended referendum vote against level of education (Turkish Cypriots)




Figure 12a. Cross tabulation of intended referendum vote against level of income (Greek Cypriots)





Figure 12b. Cross tabulation of intended referendum vote against level of income (Turkish Cypriots)





Beyond this basic demographic analysis, an additional set of questions arises, regarding the relation of intended referendum vote with the underlying desire for a settlement; with levels of support or opposition to the status quo; and with the actual vote in the 2004 referendum. Additionally, one might ask to what extent the referendum results will be determined by political party affiliation, and more precisely which segments of the population will be amenable to such political influence. To shed some light on these questions we have conducted a 'Decision Tree' analysis, which is a statistical method designed to reveal the underlying decision process that affects respondents when they declare that they are tending towards a 'Yes' or towards a 'No', or are swing voters.<sup>13</sup>

The first important finding that emerges from this Decision Tree analysis is that, in both communities, the vote in the 2004 referendum served as a 'formative experience' and acts as the first point of reference from which voters will make their future decision. From this point onwards, we see differentiation between the two communities. Among the Greek Cypriots, those who voted 'Yes' in the 2004 referendum now tend to branch-off into two distinct groups: those who have in the meantime accepted the status quo, thus exhibiting a tendency to be swing voters this time round, and those who fervently reject the status quo, who can be expected to vote a 'strong Yes' this time as well. Among Greek Cypriots who had voted 'No' in 2004, the situation is somewhat more complex. Those who declare a low desire for a settlement will give the matter no further thought and vote 'No' again. Those who voted 'No' in 2004, but declare a basic desire for a settlement but with ambivalent or even positive feelings about the status quo will turn to their political party for guidance. This specific voter group, comprised of former 'No voters' who are now torn between their desire for a settlement and their 'comfort' with the current situation, can be expected to listen very carefully to their party's line, alongside their own evaluation of the proposed plan and its consequences in their daily lives (see Figure 13a).

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<sup>13</sup> The Greek Cypriot Decision Tree was grown in accordance with the QUEST method. The model correctly classified 51.1% of all cases (null model = 20% correct classification). The Turkish Cypriot Decision Tree was grown in accordance with the CRT method and pruned to avoid overfitting to a maximum difference in risk of 1 standard error. The model correctly classified 50.8% of all cases (null model = 20% correct classification)

Figure 13a. 'Decision Tree' analysis of the decision process underlying the intended referendum vote (Greek Cypriots)





Figure 13b. 'Decision Tree' analysis of the decision process underlying the intended referendum vote (Turkish Cypriots)



In contrast with the Greek Cypriots, in the Turkish Cypriot community, dilemmas characterise former 'Yes' voters instead. In fact most Turkish Cypriot former 'No' voters can be expected to vote 'No' again, while former 'Yes' voters can be expected to divide between those who still strongly desire a settlement and are expected to vote 'Yes' again, and those who are ambivalent or no longer desire a settlement. This final group, of former 'Yes' voters who have lost faith in a settlement, can also be expected to turn to the political leadership for guidance (see Figure 13b). Thus, in both communities there seems to be an inverse relationship between internal conviction and willingness to receive guidance from political authorities, a factor that will undoubtedly affect the outcome of any future referendum.

It should be noted however that the above mentioned groups, of internally inconsistent Greek Cypriot 'No' voters and internally inconsistent Turkish Cypriot 'Yes' voters who are open to receiving guidance in either direction, are not large enough segments of society to swing, by themselves, the referendum results.<sup>14</sup> Most Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots do in fact have strong and clear-cut views on issues relating to the Cyprus conflict and can thus be expected to trust their own judgement in any proposed settlement.

Given the importance of swing voters, we enquired directly into the determining factors that would lead undecided respondents to tilt one way or another. The results are clear-cut and verify the above analysis: as far as the mainstream of swing voters goes, they will above all look into the substance of the plan, rather than be influenced by the positions of particular actors, be this their family, their friends, their political party, their president or their 'motherland'. The only partial exception to this conclusion is the relative weight attached by Turkish Cypriot swing voters to Turkey's position (28%). In the actual practice of evaluating a proposed settlement plan, this could mean a higher attributed value to security issues for the Turkish Cypriots, security being amongst Turkey's principal concerns in a Cyprus settlement. Linked to Turkey's role and position, it is also notable that the Greek Cypriot swing vote is highly sensitive to the perceptions of Turkey's post-settlement intentions, that is, 'whether Turkey

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<sup>14</sup> The precise segment of the electorate that can be classified as 'swing voters amenable to social and political influence' is approximately 10% of the population in each community, as will be seen in the cluster analysis below.

will have convinced me that it intends to honour the agreement' (45%). Thus, taken together, these two findings highlight the critical role that Turkey will play in securing a Cyprus settlement. Beyond Turkey's position towards a future settlement, for undecided voters on both sides the issues that rank highest as determining factors in a future vote are, for Greek Cypriot swing voters, the security and guarantees provisions in the plan, which influence 85% of swing voters, territory (60%), citizenship (57%), property (53%) and governance (39%); valued most by Turkish Cypriot swing voters are security and guarantees (66%), property (49%), power-sharing (44%), the economy (39%) and the legal status of sovereignty (34%) (Figure 14).

An additional cluster analysis of swing voter priorities reveals that Greek Cypriot swing voters fall into three major categories: those who are concerned exclusively or almost exclusively with security issues (40% of swing voters, 24% of total population): those who will evaluate the future plan in all its major dossiers (42% of swing voters, 22% of total population); and those who are amenable to social influence from the leader of their community, their political party or their close social and family circle (18% of swing voters, 10% of total population) (see Figure 15). In contrast, Turkish Cypriots fall into four major categories: those who will evaluate the plan in a balanced manner (50% of swing voters, 21% of total population), those who are amenable to social and political influence (23% of swing voters, 9% of total population), those who will look almost exclusively into the citizenship provisions of the plan (13% of swing voters, 5% of the total population), but additionally those who are driven by trust-related issues and will make their decision on the basis of whether they perceive the Greek Cypriots to be a credible, trustworthy and safe partner (14% of swing voters, 6% of total population) (see Figure 16).

Figure 14. Of these possible factors, which five do you think will most influence your decision to vote 'Yes' or 'No' at a future referendum? (question addressed only to 'swing voters' as identified in the question regarding intended vote in a future referendum)




Figure 15. Cluster analysis of voter profiles in a future referendum (Greek Cypriots)





Figure 16. Cluster analysis of voter profiles in a future referendum (Turkish Cypriots)



The results for swing voter preferences analysed alongside the results regarding the priorities of the two communities as a whole (see Figure 3 above) lead us to conclude that security is the number one concern for both communities, while property and governance are also important concerns for both communities, each of these dossiers influencing more than 35% of swing voters within each community; territory is of prime concern to the Greek Cypriots, while the economy is of prime concern to the Turkish Cypriots. Citizenship is a prime concern of Greek Cypriots as a whole, and yet it is the sole issue on which a substantial minority group within the Turkish Cypriot community will vote. It is to the vexatious issues within these dossiers that we now turn.

#### **4. Security: Guarantees, Rights of Intervention and Peacekeeping**

Our poll data revealed security to be a prime issue of concern for both communities. To date, beyond general statements made by the two leaderships, with the Greek Cypriot side insisting on the abolition of the Treaty of Guarantee and the Turkish Cypriots adamant on its continuation, the security dossier has not been tackled in direct negotiations. Yet turning to the people and delving into the details of the security provisions of a future agreement, we found scope for convergence, particularly on less conventional options lying beyond the traditional positions to which the leaderships have been anchored over the decades.

Beginning with the thorniest issue – guarantees – we predictably found divergence on the question of whether there should be a continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee as it currently stands, which Greek Cypriots deem to be entirely unacceptable (69%). About half of Greek Cypriots (48%) also strongly reject the continuation even of an amended version of the existing Treaty of Guarantee, a finding that highlights the challenges of attempting to solve the security dossier on the basis of the Treaties that accompanied the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 (Figure 17a). While the Turkish Cypriots are predictably more positive over the prospect of a continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee, it is interesting to note that their support for such a scheme is far from enthusiastic, with only 47% of Turkish Cypriots finding the continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee satisfactory or essential, 27% finding it merely tolerable and 26%



finding it unacceptable.<sup>15</sup> For Greek Cypriots, the ideal solution would simply be to avoid any kind of treaty between Cyprus, Turkey and Greece, and just allow international law and the UN Charter to govern relations between them (62% satisfactory to essential). This however is the worst option for Turkish Cypriots, with 57% finding it unacceptable or merely tolerable, but interestingly, again, 43% finding it satisfactory. In addition, the specific option of not having any treaty whatsoever would also have to be evaluated in the light of Turkey's security role on the island and the value attributed by Turkish Cypriots to Turkey's position on a future plan (see Figure 14), as well as the importance of the guarantee issue for the Turkish Cypriot leadership.<sup>16</sup> In view of these realities, any proposal to entirely do away with any kind of Treaty super-structure would swiftly lead to the conversion of this Turkish Cypriot public ambivalence over the 'no Treaty' proposal into a strong rejection.

Of course, any settlement in Cyprus would require, at minimum, the adaptation of the existing Treaty of Guarantee to the 'new state of affairs' that would include, among other features, bizonality. The 2004 UN blueprint included additional protocols to amend the treaty so that it would carry over *mutatis mutandis*. However, the proposal that the Treaty of Guarantee should be maintained but amended is not especially popular either (see Figures 17a and 17b). In particular, amending the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee runs a risk of not overcoming Greek Cypriots' negative perceptions regarding the specific document, as evidenced in the current poll, so this is a public presentation challenge that the negotiators ought to keep in mind.

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<sup>15</sup> One could argue that the Turkish Cypriots are a divided society, with a fundamental polarising issue being the relation of the Turkish Cypriots to Turkey. Seen from this point of view, those who answered to the above question that they support the continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee – about half – may be seen as the segment of the population wishing to see Turkey remain on the island and are aligned to Ankara without hesitation; those who 'merely tolerate' the Treaty of Guarantee – about one quarter – as well as those who reject it, may represent an ambiguity regarding the role of Turkey in Cyprus as well as on sources of security.

<sup>16</sup> The Turkish Cypriot leadership has repeatedly affirmed the need for a continuation of effective guarantees that would not simply remain 'on paper'. See 'Foreign Minister Avci criticizes Christofias', 13 October 2008, TRNC Foreign Ministry website.

*Figure 17a. One important issue in these current negotiations, regarding the security and guarantees dossier, is the manner in which unified Cyprus, Greece and Turkey will co-operate to ensure that the implementation of a settlement will happen smoothly as agreed in advance. In this matter, how acceptable or unacceptable do you consider each of the following overall frameworks? (Greek Cypriots)*





Figure 17b. One important issue in these current negotiations, regarding the security and guarantees dossier, is the manner in which unified Cyprus, Greece and Turkey will co-operate to ensure that the implementation of a settlement will happen smoothly as agreed in advance. In this matter, how acceptable or unacceptable do you consider each of the following overall frameworks? (Turkish Cypriots)



Another possibility that may win the support or at least the tolerance of significant majorities in both communities, would be a new treaty signed by a post-settlement Cyprus, Turkey and Greece, in a spirit of equality between the signatory states that would clarify all the signatories' responsibilities regarding the implementation of an agreement. Depending on its design, this may or may not be significantly different from an amended Treaty of Guarantee. Particular provisions will be elaborated on below. The primary advantage of this option is that it is more likely to motivate Greek Cypriots to ratify a settlement in a referendum while not necessarily being ruled out by the Turkish Cypriot voters.

This proposal actually ranks first for Turkish Cypriots (55% satisfactory, 26% tolerable, 19% unacceptable), marginally over the proposal for a continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee that was discussed above. Of course the level of acceptability of such a proposal would ultimately depend on the specific terms of a new treaty and whether it indeed responds credibly and effectively to Turkish Cypriot security needs. The reasons for the relative popularity of this proposal among Turkish Cypriots would require subsequent investigation but may be related to, on the one hand the emphasis on the implementation of the settlement, an issue over which the Turkish Cypriots are very sensitive, and on the other hand to the emphasis on the equality between the signatory states. For the Greek Cypriots, this proposal ranks second after the 'no Treaty' proposal (46% satisfactory to essential, 25% tolerable, 29% unacceptable), but it is still acceptable enough to form a framework for the resolution of the security aspect of the Cyprus conflict. Again, as in the case of the Turkish Cypriots, the ultimate acceptability of such a proposal would depend on the specific terms of the treaty and the extent to which it responds to their security concerns.

In this context, and irrespective of the label and symbolism with which the treaty superstructure is imbued, what specific treaty provisions would be effective in convincing both communities that their security needs have been met? The first and primary question regards rights of intervention and in particular under which conditions and through which procedures external actors would be called upon to intervene.

Unsurprisingly, Greek Cypriots reject unilateral rights of intervention without prior consensus between the signatories (76% viewing this as entirely unacceptable), and about half of Turkish Cypriots reject both the exclusion of military means of intervention as well as abolishing rights of

intervention altogether (47% viewing both options as entirely unacceptable) (see Figures 18a and 18b). By contrast, we found a measure of convergence between the communities on several options.

One option for a new or revised treaty is to introduce the EU or UN as guarantors of implementation of any agreement. This is generally popular with Greek Cypriots who strongly favour this (see Figure 19a). To lesser degrees, Greek Cypriots are also open to consensual mechanisms that are designed to resolve implementation-related challenges, subsequently leading to a UN role in mediating outcomes.

Turkish Cypriots are also cautiously open to this consensual option, though we note significant resistance to giving the UN Security Council a role in implementation under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter (see Figure 19b). These findings taken together suggest that a further exploration of consensual models, which capitalise on the initial willingness of the two communities to work for consensus on implementation-related challenges, might be worth pursuing in research and in the negotiations. The key challenge in this respect would be to devise a mechanism whereby decisions on action in cases of an implementation-related crisis would be made with the consensus of unified Cyprus, Turkey and Greece, while also considering channels, viewed as credible by all sides, to effectively resolve deadlocks in cases where consensus between the parties proves elusive.

While some type of 'consensus model' is met with initial interest by the Turkish Cypriots, of all the offered options, Turkish Cypriots are most at ease with the clarification of a set of guidelines that establishes appropriate responses and responsibilities to implementation problems that may arise. In this spirit, intervention by Greece and Turkey, as well as by the UN and the EU (the latter intervening exclusively within the realm of its competences through the suspension of EU benefits and voting rights) could be mandated in relation to specific non-implementation scenarios, assigning to each scenario the appropriate response and responsibility by each actor (see Figures 19a and 19b).

Figure 18a. Regarding the specifics of any possible treaty or other agreement between the above mentioned sides on the implementation of a comprehensive settlement, how acceptable or unacceptable would you consider the inclusion of each of the following elements? (Greek Cypriots - responses to 'intervention rights' related questions)




Figure 18b. Regarding the specifics of any possible treaty or other agreement between the above mentioned sides on the implementation of a comprehensive settlement, how acceptable or unacceptable would you consider the inclusion of each of the following elements? (Turkish Cypriots - responses to 'intervention rights' related questions)



*Figure 19a. Regarding the specifics of any possible treaty or other agreement between the above mentioned sides on the implementation of a comprehensive settlement, how acceptable or unacceptable would you consider the inclusion of each of the following elements? (Greek Cypriots - responses to implementation guarantees related questions)*







Figure 19b. Regarding the specifics of any possible treaty or other agreement between the above mentioned sides on the implementation of a comprehensive settlement, how acceptable or unacceptable would you consider the inclusion of each of the following elements? (Turkish Cypriots - responses to implementation guarantees related questions)



The issue thus becomes: what kind of non-implementation challenge, i.e., what kind of threat scenario, would warrant what kind of response and by whom? When asked about likely threat scenarios, both communities remain anchored in memories and fears of the past: Greek Cypriots are most concerned about issues relating to Turkey's compliance, above all the withdrawal of troops (77%), the agreed repatriation of 'settlers' (77%) and the abuse of guarantor rights (68%), as well as internal Cypriot issues such as Turkish Cypriot return of agreed properties (71%) and problems and deadlocks in governance (58%). Turkish Cypriots are concerned about Greek Cypriot usurpation of their collective rights, fearing most the deadlocks in governance (78%) that might lead to Greek Cypriots evicting or rendering politically ineffective Turkish Cypriots at the federal level (58%) (Figure 20).

As far as appropriate responses to these threat scenarios by external guarantors are concerned, Greek Cypriots reject any kind of military intervention by Greece and Turkey, preferring instead a mix of EU sanctions and UN peacekeeping for the different non-implementation challenges. Turkish Cypriots instead prefer military intervention by guarantor actors in cases of attempted military control over all of Cyprus (interestingly both by Greece/Greek Cypriots against the Turkish Cypriot constituent state and vice versa) and attempted secession. The most likely reading of the latter result is that military intervention may have been interpreted as Turkey acting in support of the Turkish Cypriot side attempting secession because they find themselves under attack or oppression by Greek Cypriots or Greece. Note further that among Turkish Cypriots the lowest response to support for military intervention is 17%, which can be interpreted as the baseline resistance to any kind of abrogation of Turkey's intervention rights among a segment of Turkish Cypriot society. Another interesting finding, pointing to a certain mirror situation between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, is that whereas Greek Cypriots have a distinctly higher threat perception when it comes to issues pertaining to Turkey's compliance, they tend to reject Greek military responses to these, thus showing that they either reject the principle of military intervention per se, or alternatively that they reject Greece as a credible provider of military security against Turkey. By contrast whereas Turkish Cypriots are far more willing to accept Turkish military responses under particular scenarios, for those threat scenarios they are most concerned about – Greek Cypriot usurpation of their collective rights – they would prefer to see either EU sanctions or a mix of Turkish intervention,

EU sanctions and UN peacekeeping. Turkish Cypriot preferences for Greek/Turkish military intervention are most prominent in those issues that are explicitly military in nature – such as an armed incursion by one community/motherland against the other, while for governance-related threats responses tend toward favouring the ‘chastising’ role that the EU could have on a political or economic level. Regarding one of their most crucial concerns – being evicted by the Greek Cypriots at the federal level – Turkish Cypriots are divided in that they put varying emphasis on different responses by the EU, the UN and the motherlands in protecting the Turkish Cypriots and restoring order (see Figures 21a and 21b).

A final security aspect relates to future peacekeeping arrangements. Here we find the scope for convergence to be narrow, but possible. Greek Cypriots reject a continuation of the 1960 Treaty of Alliance both under the scenario that it would apply until both communities agree it is no longer required (61% unacceptable) and under the scenario whereby it would apply until Turkey enters the EU (65% unacceptable); the persistence of the British sovereign bases (74% unacceptable), a Turkish military base in return for the cancellation of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance (90% unacceptable), the stationing of several thousand Greek and Turkish soldiers (87% unacceptable), and the stationing of a NATO force alongside Cyprus’ NATO membership (56% unacceptable). Turkish Cypriots concur – for different reasons – in rejecting a continuation of the Treaty of Alliance (59% unacceptable), including up until Turkey’s EU membership (55% unacceptable), a finding that is counter-intuitive and deserves to be commented upon. What might be happening here is that Turkish Cypriots reject both the small size of the proposed forces (less than 1,000 troops from each ‘motherland’) and the notion that the contingents would not be equally sized (950 Greek and 650 Turkish soldiers). Furthermore, strong minorities of Turkish Cypriots also reject an international force authorised by a UN Chapter 7 mandate (44% unacceptable), as well as a European security force including soldiers from Greece and Turkey stationed in Cyprus (44% unacceptable). In contrast, Turkish Cypriots would support the presence of several thousand Turkish and Greek soldiers so long as they are in equal numbers (61% satisfactory) or even the stationing of a Turkish military base in the north in return for the cancellation of the 1960 Treaties (56% satisfactory). Both these options, as discussed above, are strongly unacceptable to Greek Cypriots, however.

Figure 20. The possibility of challenges and difficulties after a solution is agreed is often discussed and considered within each community. Regarding this matter, which of these post-solution scenarios do you consider most likely to materialise in the future? (up to five responses)




Figure 21a. For each of these threat scenarios, what type of external intervention aimed at restoring order would you be willing to consider? (Greek Cypriots)





Figure 21b. For each of the following threat scenarios, what type of external intervention aimed at restoring order would you be willing to consider? (Turkish Cypriots)



Initial convergence seems instead to be possible on the creation of a unified bicomunal force (68% of the Turkish Cypriots and 82% of the Greek Cypriots), confirming the results of our first survey, which found that 72% of the Greek Cypriots and 67% of the Turkish Cypriots favoured the creation of such a force. Both communities also concur that such a force could participate in UN missions abroad (68% of the Turkish Cypriots and 78% of the Greek Cypriots) and ESDP missions together with Greece and Turkey (75% of the Turkish Cypriots and 63% of the Greek Cypriots).<sup>17</sup> Important issues to research further in future public opinion polls but also to clarify on an expert level in relation to the creation of such a unified bicomunal security force include, the precise mandate of such a force, the chain of command leading up to the federal level, whether non-Cypriots would be included in the force and at which levels, etc. In addition to a bicomunal force, both sides also would find satisfactory or at the very least tolerate a new UNFICYP mandate to oversee the implementation of the agreement (72% of the Turkish Cypriots and 90% of the Greek Cypriots) (see Figures 22a, 22b, 23a, 23b).

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<sup>17</sup> It should be noted in this regard that in the 1960 Agreements a provision was included for the establishment of a Cyprus army, which however was never implemented due to disagreements over specific issues that had to do with the disbanding of the militias and the establishment of the new army. If a proposal to create a unified bicomunal security force is now taken up in the context of a new federal Cyprus, the relevant events of the 1960s should be read as a case study of pitfalls to avoid when attempting to proceed to a new security order. Along with the issue of the disbanding and/or withdrawal of existing troops, the creation of any new security force would definitely have to be supervised very closely through whatever implementation mechanism is established.

Figure 22a. On the matter of which troops, if any, will be present in Cyprus after a Comprehensive Settlement, how much would you be willing or unwilling to tolerate the presence of each of the following? (Greek Cypriots - responses for Cypriot, Turkish and Greek troops)






Figure 22b. On the matter of which troops, if any, will be present in Cyprus after a Comprehensive Settlement, how much would you be willing or unwilling to tolerate the presence of each of the following? (Turkish Cypriots - responses for Cypriot, Turkish and Greek troops)




Figure 23a. On the matter of which troops, if any, will be present in Cyprus after a Comprehensive Settlement, how much would you be willing or unwilling to tolerate the presence of each of the following? (Greek Cypriots - responses for third party troops)





Figure 23b. On the matter of which troops, if any, will be present in Cyprus after a Comprehensive Settlement, how much would you be willing or unwilling to tolerate the presence of each of the following? (Turkish Cypriots - responses for third party troops)



Regarding the issue of the British bases, an important footnote is in order: Turkish Cypriots reject the continued presence of British troops stationed in the Sovereign Base Areas (57% unacceptable), just as the Greek Cypriots do (74% unacceptable). The fact that both communities agree that Britain's military presence in Cyprus is unwelcome must be interpreted thoughtfully. The current mainstream thinking on the SBAs is that it will be kept separate from the process leading to a settlement – in other words, it is simply not part of the current peace process.<sup>18</sup> Yet given these very high levels of unpopularity<sup>19</sup> one could reasonably infer that in the case of a settlement it would not be long before the new federal government would seek to re-negotiate the status of the British bases. Causes that rally inter-communal support in matters of foreign and security policy will be hard to find during the early post-settlement years, and therefore turning against the SBAs will be a way for political leaders of both communities to boost their popularity and forge inter-communal unity. With this in mind, it might be in Britain's best interest to engage now in a dialogue to clarify the future of the bases as part of the settlement agreement. Options to consider in this dialogue might for instance include offering to put the SBAs under a broader ESDP umbrella while remaining under British administration, repeating the offer originally made in 2004 to relinquish to unified Cyprus agricultural lands in the vicinity of the SBAs, offering to pay rent to the federal government for the use of its territory, and offering to re-evaluate the legal status of the bases in line with contemporary international norms. Such a creative course of action would not only protect British interests

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<sup>18</sup> The status of the SBAs is governed by the 1960 Treaty of Establishment, and in this sense is semi-independent of Greek-Turkish-Cypriot security issues as these relate to the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. The Greek Cypriot leadership, concerned as it is with the legal continuity of the Republic of Cyprus, does not wish to delve into an extensive discussion of the Treaty of Establishment in the current negotiations.

<sup>19</sup> The unpopularity of the British SBAs can be interpreted both in terms of historical connotations and of current image. Greek Cypriots especially tend to espouse the narrative that the UK pursued a 'divide and rule' policy in Cyprus during the 1950s and 1960s which then led directly to the 1963 and eventually the 1974 events. More recently, Britain has been accused of interfering in the design of the Annan Plan in such a way as to secure its own strategic interests vis-à-vis the SBAs, while in 2007 and 2008 minor diplomatic crises erupted over Britain's signing of strategic partnership agreements and memorandums of understanding, firstly with Turkey and then with the Republic of Cyprus. As a result of all this, the popularity of Britain and of the SBAs is low in both communities but especially in the Greek Cypriot one.

more effectively than transferring the vagueness of the current status quo into the new state of affairs, it would also make the plan more popular in both communities, while making it easier for Turkey to consider overall alterations to the security status quo.

## **5. Property: Return and Compensation**

Property has been identified as the second issue of “core concern” for both communities. The first round of talks on the property dossier was opened in January 2009 and concluded in March 2009 with major divergences between the positions of the parties principally on the question of return versus compensation. Indeed when put in these terms, the positions of the two communities diverge widely. Quoting from our first survey we found that 91% of Greek Cypriots felt that the property issue should be solved primarily through restitution, but 52% of Turkish Cypriots viewed this as entirely unacceptable.<sup>20</sup>

Yet moving away from general terms and seasoned labels, our second survey found that greater convergence is possible when Cypriots are asked about which categories of property they would be willing to consider return or compensation (see Figures 24a and 24b). Both communities concur that return could be foreseen for currently unused properties (99% of Greek Cypriots and 67% of Turkish Cypriots support or are open to restitution), for properties that are only partly being used and do not constitute primary residences nor are vital for income generation (99% of Greek Cypriots and 55% of Turkish Cypriots support or are open to restitution), and for properties used by third country nationals as residences or holiday homes (99% of Greek Cypriots and 58% of Turkish Cypriots support or are open to restitution). There could instead be compensation or a mix of restitution and compensation for properties where public utilities are built (67% of Greek Cypriots and 84% of Turkish Cypriots support or are open to compensation). Concerning properties that have been built in formerly empty plots (41% of Greek Cypriots and 79% of Turkish Cypriots support or are open to compensation), properties with significant improvements (41% of Greek Cypriots and 79% of Turkish Cypriots support or are open to compensation), and commercial properties used for income generation (31% of Greek Cypriots and 76% of Turkish Cypriots support or are open to this option).

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<sup>20</sup> Kaymak, Lordos & Tocci (2008) , op. cit., p. 38.

Figure 24a. Regarding the Property issue, the most important decision to be made in the negotiations is whether particular properties will be returned to their pre 1963/1974 owners or whether instead their ownership will pass to the current user and the original owner will be compensated for the loss of his property. For each of these categories of property, which types of resolution would you be willing to consider? (Greek Cypriots)





Figure 24b. Regarding the Property issue, the most important decision to be made in the negotiations is whether particular properties will be returned to their pre 1963/1974 owners or whether instead their ownership will pass to the current user and the original owner will be compensated for the loss of his property. For each of these categories of property, which types of resolution would you be willing to consider? (Turkish Cypriots)



Moving on to the more controversial cases, the issue of properties being used by 'settlers' (99% of Greek Cypriots and 49% of Turkish Cypriots supporting or accepting restitution) calls for further exploration. On the one hand, the strength of sentiment of Greek Cypriots on this issue, ranking second only to the demand that unused properties be returned, cannot be ignored. In a scenario whereby these properties remain with current users (that is, settlers from Turkey) who would take precedence over original Greek Cypriot owners, one can expect the issue to operate as a very effective rallying cry in a future referendum campaign in favour of a 'No' vote in the Greek Cypriot community. On the other hand, simply evicting 'settlers' from the residences they are currently using without offering a viable alternative for these groups and individuals to sustain themselves with dignity is going to lead to more problems in the future, when an increase in the crime rate and other indicators of social tension may be evidenced. Perhaps an appropriate solution might be for new homes to be built for those 'settlers' who will be staying, on state-owned land, to be financed possibly by the international community - while at the same time the original Greek Cypriot owners will have their homes unconditionally returned to them, thus satisfying their sense of justice (see Figure 3) and softening the blow of the realisation that a certain number of 'settlers' will inevitably remain in Cyprus after a settlement.

Regarding religious properties (e.g. Greek Orthodox churches in the north, Muslim mosques in the south) a troubling picture emerges. While a clear majority of Greek Cypriots insists that such properties should be returned (56% must definitely be returned, only 3% compensation is preferable), about half of Turkish Cypriots strongly reject the restitution of religious properties (46% must definitely remain with current users). While eventually and for numerous reasons - support of the Greek Cypriot position by the Council of Europe, fear that unless such properties are returned the Church will convince Greek Cypriots to vote 'No' - it is probable that religious properties will be restituted, the strength of Turkish Cypriot sentiment on this matter needs to be understood and addressed. It was noted earlier that Turkish Cypriots are very sensitive to cultural issues; specifically on maintaining their cultural and communal identity. What seems to be at play here is not so much a desire by Turkish Cypriots to limit the religious freedom of Greek Cypriots (Turkish Cypriots rank the granting of religious freedom in the 'other' constituent state just as highly as Greek Cypriots - see Figure 36b), but rather a fear that if all these churches are returned and allowed to function again - essentially at least



one church in the central square of almost every village in the north – this would amount to a ‘cultural invasion’ of the Greek Orthodox Church in what are currently Turkish Cypriot communities. Solutions might need to be sought here through in-depth social research on the ground and through the example of other multi-cultural and multi-religious cities in Europe, to see how similar problems have been addressed and resolved elsewhere.

Finally, the most important case of properties that are currently used by refugees of the other community (Greek Cypriot properties in the north used by Turkish Cypriot refugees, Turkish Cypriot properties in the south used by Greek Cypriot refugees) has unfortunately not been resolved in the survey. Although a question was included on this matter, in the end the failure to specify and distinguish between the two different cases rendered the question ‘double-barrelled’ and therefore invalid from a methodological point of view. It would seem that Turkish Cypriots read the question to mean ‘Turkish Cypriot properties used by Greek Cypriots in the south’, and on that basis insisted that such properties be returned to original owners, not realising that such a scheme would then also apply for Greek Cypriot properties that they themselves are using in the north. In a future survey it would be interesting to distinguish between these two different cases and see if responses remain the same across both types, thus indicating a position of principle, or whether the responses diverge, which would indicate a more opportunistic approach to the property issue.

Turning to the details of compensation for those properties that will not be returned, here we find significant scope for convergence between the two communities, with the Turkish Cypriot side in particular being open to all options. Greek Cypriot respondents also accept most options, with a preference for cash without delay (a mere 13% reject this), although a strong minority rejects compensation through guaranteed bonds (37% against and an additional 24% find this merely tolerable) (see Figures 25a and 25b). Many Greek Cypriots do not trust the financial system and equity markets and feel that even guaranteed bonds would not be sufficiently guaranteed, leaving them with worthless pieces of paper in their hands. The stock market crash of 2001-2, when many Greek Cypriots lost their fortunes, has also conditioned this mistrustful response to any type of ‘financial markets’ solution. The most important message to take away from these findings, however, is that given a credible compensation system the support for compensation increases; this in turn grants greater flexibility to the negotiators to devise solutions to the property issue that will be feasible to agree and implement.

Figure 25a. Regarding those properties that for whatever reason might not be returned to their original owners, how acceptable or unacceptable would you consider each of these alternative forms of compensation? (Greek Cypriots)





Figure 25b. Regarding those properties that for whatever reason might not be returned to their original owners, how acceptable or unacceptable would you consider each of these alternative forms of compensation? (Turkish Cypriots)



## 6. Governance: Decision-making, Representation and Competences

Governance also tops the list of concerns of the Cypriots, with both communities placing a special emphasis on governance and related questions (63% of Greek Cypriots and 53% of Turkish Cypriots stating that achieving a functional and democratic state is among their five top motives for a settlement, Figure 3, while 44% of Turkish Cypriot and 39% of Greek Cypriot swing voters state that they will pay special attention to the governance and power sharing provisions of the plan before deciding their vote in a future referendum, Figure 14). Governance was the first dossier to be tackled in the direct negotiations launched in September 2008, and the first round of governance-related talks in which the parties tabled their respective positions ended in January 2009. Whereas the leaders reached some degree of consensus on issues such as the distribution of competences, significant divergence has been reported on the composition, functioning and representation of the executive, as well as on the legal status of the new state and in particular on the vexed question of state succession.<sup>21</sup> Beyond the negotiations however, what do Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots think and want? What governance arrangements would they accept and can their voices aid the search for a settlement at elite levels?

The Annan Plan had ingenuously sought to detour the many riddles bedeviling agreement on a presidential system by discarding the traditional 1960 constitution solution of a presidency/vice presidency and opting for a presidential council instead.<sup>22</sup> The idea underpinning the

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<sup>21</sup> The Greek Cypriot side insists that the new Cyprus would emerge and evolve from the existing Republic of Cyprus, claiming that accepting the notion of a federation already entails a maximum level of compromise made by Makarios back in 1977. At the outset of the current round of talks, the Greek Cypriot side has also attempted to water down the federal features of the agreement by referring to “constituent provinces” rather than “constituent states” as per the Annan Plan. See Stefanos Evripidou (2008), “The really tough talks start now”, *Cyprus Mail*, 4 September.

<sup>22</sup> The presidential council proposed by the Annan Plan comprised nine members (of which at least two Turkish Cypriot voting members, and one Turkish Cypriot non-voting member), within which there would be a rotating presidency (with a president and a vice from different constituent states rotating every twenty months). The council would be elected on a single list by special majority in the senate and approved by


presidential council was both that of avoiding hierarchical relations between the communities by downplaying the issue of rotation as well as encouraging cohesiveness within the executive through elections through a single electoral ticket. Appealing as this idea may have been, our survey suggests that the presidential council runs into all sorts of obstacles because of issues of ratios of representation and voting as well as because the Turkish Cypriots feel very strongly that there should not be a common ticket presidency/executive. This is interesting to note, considering that the Turkish Cypriot side in the current round of UN sponsored negotiations has expressed its preference for a presidential council system over the presidential system.

On the question of ratios within the presidential council, we found significant divergence between the communities, with Greek Cypriots strongly rejecting equality (4:4) (93% strongly against), and Turkish Cypriots strongly rejecting minority representation (4:3 - 62% strongly against, and 4:2 - 86% strongly against). Also as far as the elections of a presidential council is concerned, we note stark divergence, with Turkish Cypriots rejecting anything short of full equality in voting power (68% of Turkish Cypriots would reject a 40% Turkish Cypriot say in a single ticket election, while 89% of Turkish Cypriots would reject a 20-25% Turkish Cypriot say in a single ticket election), and Greek Cypriots only accepting a 20-25% Turkish Cypriot say in a single ticket election (94% of Greek Cypriots would support or tolerate this solution but strong majorities would reject anything other than such a scheme of voting power in proportion to the population). It could be argued that the question of ratios would not go away under a presidency/vice presidency insofar as it would represent itself on the question of rotation time periods as well as on the issue of ratios for the appointment of federal ministers. However, these would arguably be less high profile and therefore less contentious than having to directly elect a ticket with specific ratios of representation and voting power (see Figures 29a, 29b, 30a, 30b).

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majority in the chamber of deputies. The idea of a presidential council (modelled on the Swiss constitution) was an ingenious way of escaping the deadlock between the parties on whether there should be a rotating presidency or not. The Annan Plan took up the idea of rotation, called for by the Turkish Cypriot side, but by introducing the idea of a presidential council it diminished the importance of the rotating presidency, thus taking Greek Cypriot concerns into account.

*Figure 29a. And if they do run together as one team, how much of a say do you believe each community should have in the election of such a presidential team? (Greek Cypriots)*



*Figure 29b. And if they do run together as one team, how much of a say do you believe each community should have in the election of such a presidential team? (Turkish Cypriots)*




Figure 30a. Regarding the composition of the presidency, how acceptable or unacceptable do you consider each of these ratios of representation between the two communities? (Greek Cypriots)






Figure 30b. Regarding the composition of the presidency, how acceptable or unacceptable do you consider each of these ratios of representation between the two communities? (Turkish Cypriots)



Interestingly, both communities prefer the traditional president/vice president team, though the matter is more nuanced for Greek Cypriots (51% of the Greek Cypriots supporting a president/vice president team and 36% supporting a presidential council, 62% of Turkish Cypriots supporting a president/vice president team and 24% a presidential council), being elected through direct elections (73% of the Turkish Cypriots and 95% of the Greek Cypriots preferring direct elections). Particularly interesting is also the fact that both communities concur that candidates for president/vice president should run for election separately within each community, though again the matter is more nuanced in the Greek Cypriot community (78% of the Turkish Cypriots preferring separate elections of the executive and 14% preferring a shared ticket, 48% of Greek Cypriots preferring separate elections and 44% preferring a shared ticket).<sup>23</sup> (See Figures 26, 27, 28)

Figure 26. Whichever form the presidency takes, do you prefer that the presidency is elected by the federal senate, or directly by the people?



<sup>23</sup> Opposing the idea of a single ticket election of the presidency on the grounds that this would allow Greek Cypriots to determine the Turkish Cypriot president/vice see Nicos Rolandis (2009) 'The beautiful people, enosis, partition...and our bloody mess', *Cyprus Mail*, 17 February.



Figure 27. One important issue in the current negotiations is the presidency of the new federal government. In relation to this matter, would you prefer a presidential council or a president/vice-president team?






Figure 28. Regarding the manner in which the representatives of the two communities to the presidency will be elected, do you prefer that the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots run together as one team, or that they run for election separately in each community and then the winners of each community come together and form the presidency?



The essence of a cooperative executive dealing with bicommunal federal issues embedded in the Annan Plan’s presidential council could however be salvaged by allowing for separate elections of the president/vice president but inserting an element of cross-voting in these separate elections. While the Turkish Cypriots strongly oppose single ticket elections with anything short of 50% representation, the idea of cross-voting is not rejected outright by either community. As far as the election of federal officials is concerned, majorities of both communities are prepared to accept or at the very least consider weighted cross-voting (60% of the Greek Cypriots and 68% of the Turkish Cypriots). One could thus imagine that each community would have a small say (15-20%) in the election of the executive representative of the other community. An element of cross-voting might correct the problems that could arise by having separate tickets, since it would support the election of leaders concerned with both mono-communal and inter-communal issues, while gradually encouraging – in the medium term – all political parties and leaders to update and broaden their political platforms and narratives to be more compatible with the new federal structure of government and the multiple layers of policy-making and political representation (Figure 31).

*Figure 31. More broadly regarding the manner of election of federal officials, and as a matter of principle, do you prefer mono-communal voting or weighted cross-voting? (concepts explained in detail)*



Turning to decision-making within the executive, our survey predictably found that either one community or the other rejects both the option of single majority voting (51% of Turkish Cypriots view this as unacceptable and 20% as merely tolerable) and of veto rights (50% of Greek Cypriots view this as unacceptable and 26% as merely tolerable). Convergence is instead possible on the two compromise solutions of either having minority support from each community (with 80% of Greek Cypriots and 83% of Turkish Cypriots accepting this solution) or 50% support from each community (with 77% of Turkish Cypriots and 53% of Greek Cypriots accepting or tolerating this solution). Hence under a hypothetical president/vice president team that appoints its council of ministers, decisions would still have to be made as if under a presidential council by voting procedures that would ensure a degree of consent from both communities.<sup>24</sup> (See Figures 32a and 32b)

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<sup>24</sup> The manner of selection of federal ministers presents both a challenge and an opportunity. Given the strong sensitivities of both communities on the matter of ratios as evidenced in this poll, one solution might be to maintain the ministerial ratios of 2:1 that were proposed in the Annan Plan (i.e. four Greek Cypriot ministers and two Turkish Cypriot ministers) while at the same time establishing a cross-nomination method whereby the Turkish Cypriot leader would nominate candidates for half the ministerial posts, and the Greek Cypriot leader would nominate candidates for the other half (i.e. each of them would nominate two Greek Cypriots and one Turkish Cypriot). Given that the ministers will have a formal voting right in the council of ministers, it would also be appropriate that the ministers be first ratified by the federal senate before taking up their posts.

Figure 32a. Another important matter related to the federal presidency is the manner in which decisions will be made. In this regard, how acceptable or unacceptable do you consider each of these options? (Greek Cypriots)






Figure 32b. Another important matter related to the federal presidency is the manner in which decisions will be made. In this regard, how acceptable or unacceptable do you consider each of these options?(Turkish Cypriots)



A final critical issue pertaining to governance is the distribution of competences, which would effectively determine the degree of decentralisation of governance in the new state. Here we note an interesting contrast confirming the hypothesis that as far as Cyprus is concerned, the devil is not, in fact, in the detail. When asked about general preferences regarding support for a more centralised or decentralised system, the two communities are at loggerheads with each other, with Greek Cypriots supporting a strong federal government (67%) and Turkish Cypriots preferring strong constituent states (62%) (Figure 34). By contrast, when delving into the details of competence allocation, the two communities largely see eye-to-eye. They concur that health, transport/infrastructure, environment/energy/natural resources, foreign policy and trade/industry/tourism would be shared competences (which could mean either a federal competence or constituent state competences governed through coordination agreements between the two constituent states). Both also concur that education and the supervision of cultural heritage would be communal competences (which could either mean a constituent state competence or perhaps a true 'communal' competence where each community would take care of its own education and supervision of cultural heritage regardless of where in Cyprus these are located). Issues that fall in the grey zone with community preferences either diverging or having strong minorities against allocating the competence in question to one level or another include the supervision of the police and of the banking sector, security/defence, labour/social policy, and citizenship/human rights/asylum/immigration, which could be mixed competences distributed between the two levels (see Figures 33a and 33b).

Figure 33a. Finally in the dossier of Governance and Power-sharing, the issue of the distribution of competences has also been discussed a lot recently in the negotiations. The important matter that needs to be decided is which of the following competences will be administered by each community separately, and which will be administered by the two communities working together. For each of these competences, do you prefer that your community separately manages its affairs on the issue or do you prefer that the two communities work together on the issue? (Greek Cypriots)



*Figure 33b. Finally in the dossier of Governance and Power-sharing, the issue of the distribution of competences has also been discussed a lot recently in the negotiations. The important matter that needs to be decided is which of the following competences will be administered by each community separately, and which will be administered by the two communities working together. For each of these competences, do you prefer that your community separately manages its affairs on the issue or do you prefer that the two communities work together on the issue? (Turkish Cypriots)*







Figure 34. More broadly on the issue of competences, and as a matter of principle, would you say that you prefer a strong federal government or that you prefer strong constituent states? (concepts explained in detail)



## 7. Rights, Freedoms and the Meaning of Bizonality


Issues pertaining to rights and freedoms within the new state constitute another matter of significant concern to both communities, albeit with slightly different slants and emphases. For Greek Cypriots, the emphasis is on 'being able to live and work anywhere in Cyprus' (important motive for 54% of Greek Cypriots and 48% of Turkish Cypriots), while for Turkish Cypriots the emphasis is on 'preserving our cultural identity and the cultural identity of our land' (important motive for 54% of Turkish Cypriots and 45% of Greek Cypriots) (see Figure 3). Here again we note that the scope for convergence is narrow but nonetheless possible. Among the proposed frameworks for dealing with the issue of relocation by members of one community into the area governed by the other community, the only option the Turkish Cypriots actively favour is that of relocation simply not being allowed in the other community's constituent

state (61% viewing this as essential, desirable or satisfactory), whereas all other options receive significant minority rejection by the Turkish Cypriots (ranging between 42% and 47% rejection rates). However, looking at the glass as half-full rather than half-empty, we note that slim majorities of Turkish Cypriots would accept or tolerate all options, the most acceptable being the proposal to have quotas for voting rights but not for the right to work and live throughout the island (58% acceptable or tolerable), village-by-village quotas (57% acceptable or tolerable), no quotas whatsoever (56% acceptable or tolerable),<sup>25</sup> quotas only for designated regions on the island (55% acceptable or tolerable), and an overall quota regulating resettlement (53% acceptable or tolerable). Interestingly, the differences in Turkish Cypriot support/rejection between these options highlighting different degrees and types of restrictions to rights and freedoms are rather small. Turning instead to the Greek Cypriots we note that Greek Cypriots would only accept or tolerate either no quotas at all (86% accept or tolerate) or the establishment of quotas only on voting rights (65% accept or tolerate). Of these two options, given the Greek Cypriots' particularly acute concern for this matter alongside Turkish Cypriot preference for quotas on voting rights, we could imagine that quotas would only be exercised on voting rights whereas the right to live and work would be extended to all citizens throughout the island (see Figures 35a and 35b).


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<sup>25</sup> The willingness of Turkish Cypriots to consider not having any quotas whatsoever is surprising given the emphasis that they place on 'the preservation of their cultural identity', even in this poll. One explanation might be that Turkish Cypriots no longer believe that mass relocation by Greek Cypriots to the north is likely even if the right was not regulated. In practice however, and in a dynamic pre-referendum environment, one might reasonably infer that the lack of any quotas would be strongly emphasised by the Turkish Cypriot 'No' campaign and thus awaken cultural insecurities regarding this issue.

Figure 35a. Moving on to the issue of individual rights, for any Greek Cypriots who will choose to live in the north and any Turkish Cypriots who will choose to live in the south after a Settlement, one issue that has often been discussed is how such rights will be regulated. In this context, how acceptable or unacceptable do you consider each of these options? (Greek Cypriots)



*Figure 35b. Moving on to the issue of individual rights, for any Greek Cypriots who will choose to live in the north and any Turkish Cypriots who will choose to live in the south after a Settlement, one issue that has often been discussed is how such rights will be regulated. In this context, how acceptable or unacceptable do you consider each of these options? (Turkish Cypriots)*



Backing up this suggestion, when asked about specific rights granted to citizens living in the constituent state governed by the 'other' community, whereas Greek Cypriots support, to differing degrees, the extension of all rights and freedoms to all citizens, significant minorities of Turkish Cypriots reject or are uncomfortable about extending voting rights at constituent state (38% rejection), municipal (37% rejection) and federal levels (31% rejection). While receiving greater resistance than voting rights at federal level, it is however less viable to restrict voting rights at municipal level, as opposed to constituent state or federal level due to EU norms whereby all EU citizens may exercise voting rights at the municipal level wherever they reside in Europe.

Turkish Cypriots are also concerned about extending the freedom to purchase property (38% rejection) and to start a business (35% rejection), probably because of the fear of being overrun by the more numerous and above all more affluent Greek Cypriot community. At the same time, Turkish Cypriots seem particularly attached to the right to get a job in the other constituent state (75% consider the granting of this right important) and the right to receive public benefits (63% consider the granting of this right important). These two findings taken together seem to indicate that the Turkish Cypriots consider access to the Greek Cypriot job market an important parameter of a settlement, a finding that should be read in light of the fact that, for Turkish Cypriots, 'improving our economic situation' ranks first in the list of motives for desiring a settlement (significant motive for 70% of Turkish Cypriots, see Figure 3).

Hence, with the qualified exception of voting, property acquisition and business establishment rights, a solution that would meet most of the concerns of the Greek Cypriots could foresee extending a whole range of rights to citizens throughout the island, including religious freedoms, the right to receive education in their mother tongue, the freedom of movement, the right of employment and the right to receive public benefits. In practice and when broken down into specific rights and freedoms, Turkish Cypriots appear to be attached to the principle of bizonality to the extent that they do not feel overrun by Greek Cypriots either politically (i.e., voting rights) or financially (i.e., property and business rights) and are instead rather open to the coexistence of the two communities on the ground and the development of a multi-cultural society (see Figures 36a and 36b).

Figure 36a. Looking more specifically at the types of rights that Turkish Cypriots would have in the south and Greek Cypriots would have in the north, how do you see the granting of each of the following rights? (Greek Cypriots)





Figure 36b. Looking more specifically at the types of rights that Turkish Cypriots would have in the south and Greek Cypriots would have in the north, how do you see the granting of each of the following rights? (Turkish Cypriots)



## **8. Territory and ‘Settlers’: An Inevitable Give-and-Take?**

The last two elements explored in our second survey regard the issues of territorial adjustments and the future status of immigrants from Turkey. Both issues are characterised by significant divergence between the communities and therefore agreement on both issues may be possible only through package deals across different dossiers. Beginning with territory, of the outlined options, Greek Cypriots would be willing to accept, in declining order, Varosha, Morphou and Karpas being returned to the Greek Cypriot administration (93%), Varosha and Morphou being returned to Greek Cypriot administration (93%), Varosha and Morphou being returned and the Karpas and Akamas peninsulas being converted into federal areas (75%) and Varosha and Morphou being returned and Nicosia being converted into a federal area (62%). By contrast, Turkish Cypriots essentially resist all territorial adjustments, with even the minimal adjustments of Varosha being returned to the Greek Cypriots, and Varosha, Morphou and Nicosia being converted into federal areas receiving a 65% and 62% rate of rejection respectively. This is predictable of course, in so far as territory, taken in isolation, is the one element on the conflict settlement agenda on which the Turkish Cypriots have everything to lose and nothing to gain (see Figures 37a and 37b).



Figure 37a. Regarding the Territorial aspect, how acceptable or unacceptable would you consider each of these schemes for territorial adjustment? (Greek Cypriots)





Figure 37b. Regarding the Territorial aspect, how acceptable or unacceptable would you consider each of these schemes for territorial adjustment? (Turkish Cypriots)



One lesson to be drawn from these results is that territorial readjustments may be accepted by the Turkish Cypriots only if presented as a package, most prominently by including Greek Cypriot concessions on dossiers Turkish Cypriot also attach a high value to, such as governance, bizonality and, as we shall see below, 'settlers'.<sup>26</sup> Another complementary proposal might be to opt for the creation of some federal areas, possibly in the format of federal nature preserves including areas that are currently under Greek Cypriot control such as the Akamas Peninsula, as this would give the Turkish Cypriots an 'up-side' on the territorial adjustment dossier. With the exception of 'Varosha only being returned to Greek Cypriot administration', all the options in the survey that include some federal areas are somewhat more popular amongst the Turkish Cypriots than pure 'return of territories to Greek Cypriots' options. Alongside Karpas and Akamas, perhaps a part of Troodos Mountains could also become a federal nature preserve insofar as this area is very popular to Turkish Cypriots who like to visit the mountains for weekends and holidays. In general, turning all these low-population and high tourist-interest areas (Akamas, Troodos, tip of Karpas) into federal areas has the added bonus of reducing the size of the Greek Cypriot state relative to the Turkish Cypriot one, and therefore the perceived imbalance between the two communities, which is a source of anxiety for the Turkish Cypriots.<sup>27</sup> Concomitantly it would also partly satisfy the Greek Cypriot desire for territorial reintegration, which emerged as the motive for 50% of the Greek Cypriot respondents for wanting a solution; ranking fifth out of the ten designated options (see Figure 3).

Turning to the question of Turkish immigrants and their status in a future Cyprus, here too we note significant divergence, with Greek Cypriots willing to accept a mix of citizenship and residence permits only for two categories of Turkish immigrants: those born in Cyprus of mixed Turkish/Cypriot parents (35% citizenship and 40% residence) and those

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<sup>26</sup> The whole concept of a bizonal, bicomunal federation for Cyprus is often described by commentators as a "land for power sharing" deal.

<sup>27</sup> Another innovative approach to include federal areas in a settlement entails converting the area where the federal government will be located - during the 2003/4 peace process the area that is now the UN protected area had been earmarked for this purpose - into a federal zone that would not fall within the domain of either constituent state.

married to a Turkish Cypriot (25% citizenship and 37% residence). For all other categories of Turkish immigrants, large Greek Cypriot majorities favour either immediate or gradual departure. The Greek Cypriot preference for repatriation, while less acute, is also extended to attitudes towards immigrants from other non-EU nationalities, with immediate or gradual departure options being preferred for immigrants who have been in Cyprus for less as well as for more than ten years. Greek Cypriot intolerance for the presence of Turkish or other foreign nationals links back to the Greek Cypriot tendency to be suspicious of the multicultural transformation their community is currently undergoing, as captured in our first survey.<sup>28</sup>


In stark contrast, Turkish Cypriots reject the repatriation of all categories of Turkish immigrants, including those who have been in Cyprus for less than ten years – though for this last category 47% of the Turkish Cypriots would be willing to consider a residence permit being granted, while 28% would favour repatriation and only 21% would prefer citizenship. Turkish Cypriot tolerance for the presence of Turkish immigrants is extended to attitudes towards other immigrants, where again repatriation is not recommended for any category of non-EU immigrants, including those who have been in Cyprus for less than ten years. The distinctly different attitudes between the two communities towards foreign nationals may reflect on the one hand the lower migratory pressures faced by the Turkish Cypriots, but on the other hand, their own desire to achieve a more ethnically diverse and multi-cultural society than they have today.<sup>29</sup> (See Figures 38a, 38b, 39a, 39b)

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<sup>28</sup> “Greek Cypriots in particular also appear to be maturing the potential for ethnic intolerance and xenophobia (probably not only towards Turkish Cypriots but also towards immigrants of other European countries), with only 8% of Greek Cypriots (as opposed to 37% TC) believing that ethnic diversity enriches life”. Kaymak, Lordos & Tocci (2008), *op. cit.*, p. 21.

<sup>29</sup> Kaymak, Lordos & Tocci (2008), *op. cit.*, p. 23.

Figure 38a. Regarding the persons who have come to the north from Turkey since the events of 1974, one important decision that will have to be made in the negotiations will be whether these persons can stay on in Cyprus after a Settlement or not. For each of these groups, which option or options would you find acceptable? (Greek Cypriots)



*Figure 38b. Regarding the persons who have come to the north from Turkey since the events of 1974, one important decision that will have to be made in the negotiations will be whether these persons can stay on in Cyprus after a Settlement or not. For each of these groups, which option or options would you find acceptable? (Turkish Cypriots)*




Figure 39a. Regarding the persons who have come from non-EU third countries (e.g. from Russia, Lebanon, Pakistan etc.) and now live among Greek Cypriots one important decision that will have to be made in the negotiations will be whether these persons can stay on in Cyprus after a Settlement or not. For each of these groups, which option or options would you find acceptable? (Greek Cypriots)





Figure 39b. Regarding the persons who have come from non-EU third countries (e.g. from Russia, Lebanon, Pakistan etc.) and now live among Greek Cypriots one important decision that will have to be made in the negotiations will be whether these persons can stay on in Cyprus after a Settlement or not. For each of these groups, which option or options would you find acceptable? (Turkish Cypriots)





## 9. A People's Peace in Cyprus?

Taken together our two surveys suggest that an agreement in Cyprus is possible but it will be a hard sell to the people of both communities. What matters above all and more than the positions adopted by different actors in and surrounding the Cyprus conflict is the substance of the proposed deal itself, with core issues of concern being above all: security, property, governance, rights and freedoms, territory and settlers.

Any agreement on security would have to reconcile strongly expressed Greek Cypriot concerns regarding Turkish military intervention with Turkish Cypriot desires that Turkey remain a credible guarantor of an agreement. Given bizonality and other facts related to any 'new state of affairs' the extant Treaty of Guarantee would require amendment anyway, as was the case when the Annan Plan blueprint called for additional protocols. Amending the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, however, runs a risk of not overcoming Greek Cypriots' negative perceptions of the specific document, as evidenced in the current poll; with this in mind, a new treaty, designed in such a way as to also be acceptable to Turkish Cypriots, is a possible alternative to serve as the basis of a new security regime in Cyprus.

While negotiating and designing the future security and treaty architecture of unified Cyprus is a delicate matter, which will require the committed and creative high level involvement of all relevant parties both in Cyprus and internationally, public opinion on the ground does seem to suggest specific elements that could be considered further by the formal negotiators. For one, the treaty could 'unpack' the security and implementation challenges that unified Cyprus may face in the future, differentiating between potential military threats, governance crises and instances of non-implementation of the agreement, defining for each a differentiated response mechanism that could, as needed in each case, involve the federal and constituent state governments in Cyprus, the governments of Greece and Turkey, the EU and the UN. Authorisation for action in cases of non-implementation remains problematic, since there is divergence on the issue of unilateral intervention rights as well as on whether the UN or the EU could also serve as enforcers in the case of non-implementation. In this regard further research is called for, exploring alternative consensus models and suggesting ways in which future disagreements between the treaty signatories could be resolved.

Whatever the particular variation, the key point is that a new security regime serves as a potential point of convergence that could be potentially promoted by political leaders as a viable alternative to the status quo. This could also be combined with the creation of a bicomunal force, which together with Greek and Turkish troops would participate in UN peacekeeping and possibly ESDP missions abroad, as well as a renewed mandate for UNFICYP to monitor the implementation of the agreement on the ground (see Figure 40).

Bicomunal consensus could also be reached on the property dossier with the breakdown of properties into different categories and the order of priority to decide whether a property would be returned or compensated for would vary between categories of property. Specifically, original owners could have priority in the cases of unused properties and properties used by 'settlers' or other non-Cypriots, while current users could have priority in the cases of properties on which public utilities have been built, or that are being used as shops and factories, or that have more generally been significantly improved and built upon. The most complex case to resolve is that of properties that are now being used by refugees from the other community as primary residences; for these types of properties, it is envisioned that a more specific set of criteria should be used to decide on who would have priority, though a give-and-take solution can be envisioned whereby priority for properties used by displaced persons remains with current users while priority for religious heritage sites is granted to original owners. More broadly, where properties would be compensated for rather than returned, a mix of different compensation schemes could be foreseen, including compensation in cash, and compensation with other properties of equivalent value, preferably avoiding the option of government bonds for which the Greek Cypriots have little enthusiasm (see Figure 41).

*Figure 40. Proposed provisions in the Dossier of Security and Guarantees, compatible with the requirements and sensitivities of the wider Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Population*

DOSSIER	THEME	PROPOSAL	ACCEPTABILITY IN GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY	ACCEPTABILITY IN TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY
Security and Guarantees	Treaty Architecture	A new Treaty, or an amended version of the Treaty of Guarantee, to be signed between unified Cyprus, Turkey and Greece, that will clarify each side's responsibility regarding the implementation of the agreement, in a spirit of equality between the signatory states.	Moderate	Moderate to High
Security and Guarantees	Treaty Architecture	A set of guidelines to be agreed in advance by all the sides, clarifying the appropriate response and responsibility for each implementation-related challenge that may in the future arise.	High	High
Security and Guarantees	Troops	A moderately sized professional security force to be established, bicomunal in composition, which will be responsible to defend the island from internal and external threats, while also serving in peacekeeping missions abroad.	High	High
Security and Guarantees	Troops	A UN Force that will be the successor of today's UNFICYP to be mandated, which will be overseeing matters related to the implementation of the solution, and which will remain in Cyprus until all sides jointly agree that its presence is no longer required	High	Moderate

Security and Guarantees	Troops	A common Cypriot-Greek-Turkish security force to be established, that will be serving together in missions outside Cyprus within the context of the European Security and Defence Policy	Moderate to Low	Moderate to High
Security and Guarantees	Supervision of Implementation	Response by the EU and UN at a political / sanctions level in case of a governance crisis or of a crisis in the implementation of the terms of the agreement	Moderate to High	Moderate to High
Security and Guarantees	Supervision of Implementation	Response by the UN at first instance, and then by the 'motherlands' as a last resort, in case of a military attack against one of the communities by the other community and/or its 'motherland'	Low	Moderate to High

Figure 41. Proposed order of priority, between original owners and current users, to decide on restitution v. compensation for different categories of properties affected by the Cyprus Problem

TYPE OF PROPERTY	DECISION PRIORITY	ACCEPTABILITY IN GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY	ACCEPTABILITY IN TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY
Currently unused properties	Original Owners	Very High	Moderate to High
Properties where immigrants from Turkey currently live	Original Owners	Very High	Moderate
Properties which are currently used by nationals of other countries (e.g. from Britain, Germany, Israel etc), as residences or holiday homes	Original Owners	Very High	Moderate
Partly used properties, that are not currently vital either as residences or for income generation	Original Owners	Very High	Moderate
Properties that host churches, mosques, cemeteries, and other such religious monuments (e.g. Orthodox churches in the north, mosques in the south)	Original Owners	Very High	Low
Originally privately owned properties on which public utilities - airports, hospitals, universities etc. have in the mean time been constructed	Current Users	Moderate	Very High
Properties that are currently used as factories, shops, or offices	Current Users	Moderate to Low	Very High
Properties that used to be empty plots before 1963/1974 but now have homes or apartments built on them	Current Users	Moderate to Low	Very High
Properties on which significant improvements have been made, to the extent that their real value in current prices has been increased by more than 50%	Current Users	Moderate to Low	Very High
Properties where displaced persons from the other community currently live	Current Users	Low	Very High

On governance we also registered possible convergence around the establishment of a rotating (according to set time periods) presidency/vice presidency elected through separate tickets with an element of cross-voting. The presidential team would nominate a council of ministers responsible for those ministries under federal or mixed competences. The question of representation ratios within federal offices would remain and require compromise possibly by opting for a mix of 75-25, 60-40 and 50-50 depending on the specific staffing requirement and other sensitivities of each ministry or federal office, thus de-politicising and de-polarising the issue of ratios, while in the case of the presidency this mix could be achieved by having a 2:1 ratio in terms of the communal origin of participants but a 50-50 ratio in terms of the right of each of the two leaders to nominate members in the council of ministers from both communities. A complementary way of resolving the issue of ratios involves establishing a trade-off between competences and ratios: the stronger the federal government would be in relation to the constituent states, the more equality in representation would be envisioned; and vice-versa (see Figures 42 and 43).

Compromise is possible on the question of rights and freedoms, with Turkish Cypriots willing to extend a general set of rights and freedoms to all citizens throughout the island with the qualified extension of voting, property and business establishment rights. This finding reflects how Turkish Cypriot attachment to bizonality is anchored above all in the fear of being dominated both politically and economically by the Greek Cypriots, while at the same time they maintain openness towards the principle of coexistence of the two communities and the creation of a multicultural society.

Major divergences lie in the territory and 'settlers' dossiers which may call for a 'give and take' between these two dossiers. Territorial readjustments will inevitably be a major area of Turkish Cypriot concession, but the blow may be softened by including some federal areas (particularly in what is now Greek Cypriot territory) in the new map of Cyprus. As far as immigrants from Turkey are concerned, differences may well have to be split down the middle, while at the same time Greek Cypriot anxieties over immigration and the potential for racism and xenophobia would need to be tackled urgently through a 'multi-cultural education drive' (see Figure 44).

Figure 42. Proposed provisions in the dossier of Governance and Power-sharing, compatible with the requirements and sensitivities of the wider Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Population

DOSSIER	THEME	PROPOSAL	ACCEPTABILITY IN GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY	ACCEPTABILITY IN TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY
Governance and Power Sharing	Presidency	The Presidency to be elected directly by the People	Very High	High
Governance and Power Sharing	Presidency	The Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot candidates to run on separate ballots, and then the winners of each ballot to come together and form the Presidency	Moderate	Very High
Governance and Power Sharing	Presidency	A cross-voting element to be included, so that each community has a 15% - 20% say in the ballot of the other community	Moderate	Moderate to High
Governance and Power Sharing	Presidency	The Presidency to be comprised of a President / Vice President Team which will then appoint the remaining Ministers of the Federal Government	Moderate to High	High
Governance and Power Sharing	Presidency	Four Greek Cypriots and Two Turkish Cypriots to be appointed as Ministers of the Federal Government	High	Low
Governance and Power Sharing	Presidency	Half of the ministers (i.e. two Greek Cypriots and one Turkish Cypriot) to be nominated by the winner of the Greek Cypriot ballot, while the other half (two Greek Cypriots and one Turkish Cypriot) to be nominated by the winner of the Turkish Cypriot ballot, subject to ratification of all nominees by the Federal Senate	Low	High

Governance and Power Sharing	Presidency	Executive Decisions to be made collectively by the Federal Council of Ministers, with at least minority positive participation by the representatives of each community, and at least 50% participation for specific pre-agreed categories of decisions	Moderate	High
Governance and Power Sharing	Competences	Federal Competences to include Foreign and EU Affairs, Security and Defence, Financial Affairs, Trade, Industry and Tourism Policy, Environment, Energy and Natural Resources, and finally Citizenship and Immigration	High	Moderate to High
Governance and Power Sharing	Competences	Constituent State Competences to include Labour Policy and Social Security, Transport and Infrastructure, Supervision of the Police, Supervision of Cultural Heritage and Education	Moderate to High	High
Governance and Power Sharing	Competences	Supervision of Cultural Heritage and Education to also be treated as 'communal competences', especially for Greek Cypriot residents / heritage sites in the north and Turkish Cypriot residents / heritage sites in the south, through co-operation agreements between the Constituent States which will clarify issues of administrative and supervisory responsibility	High	High



Figure 43. Schematic representation of proposed model for the election of the federal presidency, compatible with the requirements and sensitivities of the wider Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot population




Figure 44. Proposed 'give and take' between the dossiers of Territory and Citizenship

DOSSIER	THEME	PROPOSED RESOLUTION	ACCEPTABILITY IN GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY	ACCEPTABILITY IN TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY
<b>Territory</b>	Territorial Status of Varosha	To be returned under Greek Cypriot Administration	Very High	Moderate to Low
<b>Territory</b>	Territorial Status of Morphou	To be returned under Greek Cypriot Administration	Very High	Very Low
<b>Territory</b>	Territorial Status of Karpasia Peninsula and Akamas Peninsula	To be converted into 'Federal Nature Preserves' under the direct administration of the Federal Government	Moderate	Moderate
<b>Citizenship</b>	Citizenship status of individuals who came to the north from Turkey but have married a Turkish Cypriot, and children of such mixed marriages	To be granted citizenship	Moderate	Very High
<b>Citizenship</b>	Citizenship status of children whose parents came to the north from Turkey but who were themselves born in Cyprus	To be granted citizenship	Moderate to Low	Very High
<b>Citizenship</b>	Citizenship status of individuals who came to the north from Turkey, and have been in Cyprus for more than 10 years	To be granted citizenship or permanent residency	Very Low	Very High
<b>Citizenship</b>	Citizenship status of individuals who came to the north from Turkey and have been in Cyprus for less than 10 years	To be assisted for a gradual return to Turkey, or granted residency on a case-by-case basis	Moderate to Low	Moderate to Low

What this project, with its two surveys and books, has attempted to demonstrate is that a people's peace in Cyprus is possible. Particularly when delving into the details of a future plan, including on the most vexed questions of the Cyprus settlement, we have found not only that compromise is feasible, but above all, by probing into what citizens think, fear and desire, new and creative ideas may be put to the service of the peace process on the island.

## **Annex 1. Research Methodology**

The survey questionnaire (see Annex 2) was designed by CEPS in collaboration with its Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot project partners. The questionnaire was subsequently translated into Greek and Turkish, and the field work was administered by CYMAR Market Research<sup>30</sup> in the Greek Cypriot Community and Prologue Consulting<sup>31</sup> in the Turkish Cypriot Community. The field work was conducted within a period of four weeks, from early January to early February 2009.

### **For the Greek Cypriot Community: Methodology Report by CYMAR Market Research**

#### **1. Coverage**

The survey was national and covered urban and rural areas in the government-controlled areas of the Republic of Cyprus (south of the island). Greek-Cypriot males and females 18 years and over were eligible to participate in the study.

#### **2. Conduct method**

Interviews using a questionnaire (see Annex 2) were carried out face to face at the residence of respondents.

#### **3. Sample selection**

The sample was selected using a combination of random multistage area probability sampling and quotas sampling: the sample was selected in various stages as follows:

*Stage one:* Stratification of the areas

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<sup>30</sup> CYMAR Market Research Ltd, established in 1994, is a Cyprus-based company specialising in market research. It operates primarily within the Greek Cypriot community. Cymar is a member of ESOMAR (European Society for Opinion and Market Research) and SEDEAK (Cyprus Association of Opinion Poll and Market Research Enterprises) (see <http://www.cymar.com.cy>)

<sup>31</sup> Established in 2002, Prologue Consulting Ltd is a market research and consulting company based in the northern part of Cyprus. Prologue is a member of ESOMAR (European Society for Opinion and Market Research) (see <http://www.prologueconsulting.com>).

Areas of the island covered by the study were stratified into urban and rural on the basis of the latest *2001 Population Census*, carried out by the Department of Statistical Services of the Republic of Cyprus.

*Stage two: Selection of PSUS (Primary Sampling Units)*

For the purposes of sample selection, urban areas in each district were divided into a number of enumeration areas of approximately the same size (~1000 persons each).

The greater urban area of Nicosia was divided into 209 enumeration areas, of Limassol into 161, Larnaca into 72 and Paphos into 45.

For the sample selection, the enumeration areas in urban districts and the villages in rural areas were treated as primary sampling units.

In each district, urban enumeration areas had an equal probability of being chosen as primary sampling units. By contrast, rural enumeration areas (villages) had a probability of being selected that was proportionate to their size.

In total, 68 enumeration areas in urban areas and 32 villages in rural areas were randomly selected.

Each area selected was allocated an equal number of interviews.

The distribution of the primary sampling units selected among the five districts and among urban and rural areas within each district was representative of the actual population in the south.

*Stage three: Selection of households*

Within each Primary Sampling Unit selected at stage two an equal number of households was selected in such a way that each household was given, as far as possible, an equal probability of selection.

In the selected area the interviewer was allocated a random starting point,<sup>32</sup> from which he/she commenced calling on every  $n^{\text{th}}$  household encountered.

*Stage four: Selection of individuals*

In each household selected at stage three, one person was selected based on predefined quotas. Quotas were set with respect to sex and age in

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<sup>32</sup> Both enumeration areas and starting points were randomly selected with the aid of purpose-built computer software.

order to ensure that the selected sample was representative of the target population of the survey.

#### **4. Sample size**

In total 1000 interviews were carried out.

#### **5. Questionnaire**

The questionnaire of the survey was submitted by CEPS.

#### **6. Training and control of the interviewers**

All interviewers who participated in the study have previous experience with social research, and have all completed their education, at least to secondary level.

Regardless of the experience of the interviewers, all interviewers went through a 3-day training stage before fieldwork commenced.

During the training, the questionnaires and the conduct method were fully explained and interviewers participated in pilot studies. Written instructions were given to interviewers explaining the method of sample selection, how to approach people and the point of the questionnaire.

In total, 30 interviewers and 4 supervisors worked on the study.

The interviewers delivered their work to the supervisors on a daily basis and the supervisors were responsible for the daily checking of the completed questionnaires. There was a 15% recall of the work of each interviewer to make sure of the authenticity of the responses, the time the interview took and the behaviour of the interviewers. The whole study was supervised by the manager in charge of the project.

### **For the Turkish Cypriot Community: Methodology Report by Prologue Consulting**

#### **1. Coverage**

The survey in the Turkish Cypriot Community was national and covered urban and rural areas. Turkish-Cypriot males and females of 18 years and over were eligible to participate in the study.

#### **2. Conduct method**

Interviews were carried out face to face at the residence of respondents.

### **3. Sample selection**

The sample was selected using a combination of random multistage area probability sampling and quotas sampling: The sample was selected in various stages as follows:

*Stage one:* Stratification of the areas

Areas of the island covered by the study were stratified into urban and rural on the basis of the latest *Census*, carried out by the Department of Statistical Services and the 5 districts were allocated quotas according to the natural distribution of the population.

*Stage two:* Selection of individuals

The individuals to be surveyed were selected using a specifically designed computer programme using preselected quotas. Quotas were set with respect to sex and age in order to ensure that the selected sample was representative of the target population of the survey.

### **4. Sample size**

In total 1000 interviews were carried out.

### **5. Questionnaire**

The questionnaire of the survey was submitted by CEPS.

### **6. Training and control of the interviewers**

All interviewers who participated in the study had previous experience with social research, and have all completed their education, at least to secondary level.

Regardless of the experience of the interviewers, all interviewers went through a 3-day training stage before fieldwork commenced.

During the training, the questionnaires and the conduct method were fully explained and interviewers participated in pilot studies. Written instructions were given to interviewers explaining the method of sample selection, how to approach people and the purpose of the questionnaire.

For the purposes of this study, 40 interviewers were used.

There was a recall of 25% of the work selected at random in order to make certain of the authenticity of the responses, the time the interview took and the behaviour of the interviewers. The whole study was supervised by the manager in charge of the project.

## **Annex 2. Survey Questionnaire**

### **Pre-translation template questionnaire**

*Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study regarding the Cyprus Problem, which is being supervised by the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels. Your responses will only be used for statistical analysis and remain anonymous. The duration of this interview will be about 45 minutes.*

### **Section A – Underlying Attitudes**

**A1.** Since 21<sup>st</sup> March 2008, the leaders of the two communities Demetris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat, have begun to engage in a process of negotiations for a Comprehensive Settlement, initially through Technical Committees and Working Groups and more recently through direct discussions between the two leaders.

- a. To what extent are you hopeful that this process will produce results? *(0 to 10 scale, from 0 - “no hope at all” to 10 - “great hope”, NR = 99)*
- b. To what extent do you wish - and expect from the leaders - that they reach a mutually acceptable settlement through this process? *(0 to 10 scale, from 0 - “I strongly prefer that nothing comes of this process” to 10 - “I strongly wish that this process leads to a Settlement”, NR = 99)*

**A2.** Of the following possible motives for solving the Cyprus Problem, which five are most important to you? *(Choose up to five options)*

1. Being able to live and work anywhere in Cyprus
2. Improving our economic situation
3. Ending the threat that emanates from Turkey / the Greek Cypriots
4. Putting the past behind us so we can look towards the future
5. Preserving our cultural identity and the cultural identity of our land
6. Achieving justice in relation to properties lost during the events from 1963 to 1974
7. Achieving the territorial unity of Cyprus
8. Returning to a constitutional order where the two communities share power and govern Cyprus together.
9. Fully enjoying the benefits of EU membership
10. Living within a functional, democratic and internationally respected state



**A3.** Regarding the overall framework of a Comprehensive Settlement, and considering each of the alternative settlement models presented below, how acceptable or unacceptable, in principle, do you consider each of these models? (0 to 10 scale for each, from 0 - "Entirely Unacceptable" to 10 - "Absolutely Essential", NR = 99)

1. A Bizonal Bicomunal Federation
2. A Confederation of two sovereign States
3. One Unitary State and Central Government for the whole of Cyprus
4. Two separate and internationally recognised States
5. Continuation of the current situation

**A4.** And how acceptable or unacceptable do you think each of these models is for the majority of the other community (1-Majority of the other community would definitely reject this, 2-Majority of the other community would tolerate this as a compromise option, 3-Majority of the other community would find this satisfactory, NR = 9)

1. A Bizonal Bicomunal Federation
2. A Confederation of two sovereign States
3. One Unitary State and Central Government for the whole of Cyprus
4. Two separate and internationally recognised States
5. Continuation of the current situation

## **Section B – Security and Guarantees of Implementation**

**B1.** One important issue in these current negotiations, regarding the security and guarantees dossier, is the manner in which unified Cyprus, Greece and Turkey will co-operate to ensure that the implementation of a settlement will happen smoothly as agreed in advance. In this matter, how acceptable or unacceptable do you consider each of the following overall frameworks? (0 to 10 scale for each, from 0 - "Entirely Unacceptable" to 10 - "Absolutely Essential", NR = 99)

1. The Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 - between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom - will continue to apply without any changes, as part of the Comprehensive Settlement agreement.
2. The Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 - between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom - will continue to apply but certain

amendments will be made to it in response to specific concerns expressed by one or the other community.

3. A new Treaty will be signed between unified Cyprus, Turkey and Greece, that will clarify each side's responsibility regarding the implementation of the agreement, in a spirit of equality between the signatory states.
4. There will be no Treaty specifically governing the relations between unified Cyprus, Turkey and Greece. Instead, the three States will be expected to act in compliance with International Law as set out in the UN Charter and other relevant international agreements.

**B2.** Now, regarding the specifics of any possible treaty or other agreement between the above mentioned sides regarding the implementation of a comprehensive settlement, how acceptable or unacceptable would you consider the inclusion of each of the following elements? (*0 to 10 scale for each, from 0 - "Entirely Unacceptable" to 10 - "Absolutely Essential", NR = 99*)

1. It should be made clear that the 'right of intervention' by Greece or Turkey excludes the possibility of military intervention.
2. It should be re-affirmed that the 'right of intervention' of Greece or Turkey can still be exercised unilaterally by one or the other, in case agreement between them proves impossible.
3. It should be made clear that before any military intervention can take place by Greece or Turkey, permission will need to be granted by the UN Security Council.
4. 'Rights of intervention' by Greece or Turkey should be abolished altogether on the basis that unified Cyprus is going to be a sovereign country that is capable of taking care of its own affairs.
5. A set of guidelines should be agreed in advance by all the sides, clarifying the appropriate response and responsibility for each implementation-related challenge that may in the future arise.
6. A consensual mechanism should be devised so that Turkey, Greece and unified Cyprus can resolve all implementation-related challenges that may arise; and in case consensus proves impossible then the UN will decide on what course of action must be taken.
7. The EU should set - for all the sides - motives for implementation and penalties for non-implementation, related to EU benefits and participation in EU decision making.

8. Whatever treaty is agreed should be ratified by a UN Security Council Resolution under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which would mean that in case of non-implementation the UN would have the right to forcefully intervene to restore the state of affairs agreed to in the settlement.

**B3.** On the matter of which troops, if any, will be present in Cyprus after a Comprehensive Settlement, how much would you be willing or unwilling to tolerate the presence of each of the following? (0 to 10 scale for each, from 0 - "Entirely Unacceptable" to 10 - "Absolutely Essential", NR = 99)

1. A unified bicomunal security force, comprised of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, under the control of the Federal Government and charged with various matters related to the security of Cyprus
2. British troops that will be camped in the Sovereign Base Areas as they are today
3. A UN Force that will be the successor of today's UNFICYP and which will be overseeing matters related to the implementation of the solution
4. An International Force with a full Chapter 7 Security Council mandate, with the authorization to intervene using force if necessary to ensure the implementation of the solution
5. 950 Greek soldiers and 650 Turkish soldiers as per the 1960 Treaty of Alliance to remain in Cyprus indefinitely or until both communities agree that their presence is no longer required
6. 950 Greek soldiers and 650 Turkish soldiers as per the 1960 Treaty of Alliance to be phased out as and when Turkey joins the EU
7. Several thousand (*from 3,000 to 6,000*) Greek soldiers and an equal number of Turkish soldiers
8. A Turkish military base somewhere in the northern part of Cyprus, which will be given to Turkey in return for the cancellation of the 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance.
9. A NATO force that will be in charge of the overall Security of Cyprus, and assuming that Cyprus will in the meantime also have become a full member of NATO
10. A European Security Force comprised of soldiers from various European countries, including Turkey and Greece, and charged with various matters related to the security of Cyprus

11. A common Cypriot-Greek-Turkish security force that will be serving together in missions outside Cyprus within the context of the European Security and Defence Policy
12. A unified bicomunal security force, comprised of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, that will be serving in UN Peacekeeping Missions abroad.

**B4.** The possibility of challenges and difficulties after a solution is agreed is often discussed and considered within each community. Regarding this matter, which of the following post-solution scenarios do you consider most likely to materialize in the future? (*Choose up to five options*)

1. Problems and deadlocks occur in the decision making of the Federal Government leading to inadequate governance
2. The Greek Cypriots evict or render politically ineffective the Turkish Cypriots at Federal Government level and take over for themselves all the decision making authority
3. The Turkish Cypriots with Turkey refuse to return properties and territories which it was agreed to return to their original owners in the context of the settlement
4. Turkey does not withdraw her troops from Cyprus in accordance with the agreed timetable
5. Turkey abuses her guarantor status, to interfere in the internal affairs of Cyprus
6. Greece abuses her guarantor status, to interfere in the internal affairs of Cyprus
7. The people from Turkey ('Settlers') that it was agreed should leave after a Settlement, do not depart as planned
8. Greek Cypriots with Greece attack and attempt to take over the Turkish Cypriot constituent state so that they will control all of Cyprus
9. Turkish Cypriots with Turkey attack and attempt to take over the Greek Cypriot constituent state so that they will control all of Cyprus
10. Turkish Cypriots with Turkey use whatever elements of separation are in the agreement in order to secede from the Federation and achieve a separate independent state in the north.

**B5.** And for each of the above threat scenarios, what type of external intervention aimed at restoring order would you be willing to consider? *(Response Options for each question are: 1-Military Intervention by Turkey or Greece to defend the side that is under attack, 2- Political and Economic Sanctions by the European Union against the guilty party, 3-Peacekeeping Intervention by the United Nations. Multiple Responses are permitted. NR = 9)*

1. Problems and deadlocks occur in the decision-making of the Federal Government leading to inadequate governance
2. The Greek Cypriots evict or render politically ineffective the Turkish Cypriots at Federal Government level and take over for themselves all the decision-making authority
3. The Turkish Cypriots with Turkey refuse to return properties and territories which it was agreed to return to their original owners in the context of the settlement
4. Turkey does not withdraw her troops from Cyprus in accordance with the agreed timetable
5. Turkey abuses her guarantor status, to interfere in the internal affairs of Cyprus
6. Greece abuses her guarantor status, to interfere in the internal affairs of Cyprus
7. The people from Turkey ('Settlers') that it was agreed should leave after a Settlement, do not depart as planned
8. Greek Cypriots with Greece attack and attempt to take over the Turkish Cypriot constituent state so that they will control all of Cyprus
9. Turkish Cypriots with Turkey attack and attempt to take over the Greek Cypriot constituent state so that they will control all of Cyprus
10. Turkish Cypriots with Turkey use whatever elements of separation are in the agreement in order to secede from the Federation and achieve a separate independent state in the north.

### **C. Governance and Power Sharing**

**C1.** One important issue in the current negotiations is the matter of the Presidency of the new Federal Government. In relation to this matter, do you prefer -

- a. Having a Presidential Council, where President, Vice President and ministers will all be elected to their position and decide issues together as a Council,

*Or,*

- b. Do you instead tend to favour having a strong President / Vice President Team, to include a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot, who will then appoint the remaining ministers?

*(0 to 10 scale, from 0 - 'Strongly prefer a Presidential Council' to 10 - 'Strongly prefer a President / Vice President Team', NR = 99)*

**C2.** Whichever of these two forms the Presidency takes, do you prefer that -

- a. The Presidency is elected by the Federal Senate,

*Or,*

- b. The Presidency is elected directly by the people?

*(0 to 10 scale, from 0 - 'Strongly prefer election of Presidency by the Federal Senate' to 10 - 'Strongly prefer election of Presidency by the People', NR = 99)*

**C3.** And regarding the composition of the Presidency, how acceptable or unacceptable do you consider each of the following ratios of representation between the two communities? *(0 to 10 scale for each, from 0 - "Entirely Unacceptable" to 10 - "Absolutely Essential", NR = 99)*

1. Four Greek Cypriots to Two Turkish Cypriots.
2. Four Greek Cypriots to Three Turkish Cypriots.
3. Four Greek Cypriots to Four Turkish Cypriots.

**C4.** Regarding the manner in which the representatives of the two communities to the Presidency will be elected, would you say that you prefer that -

- a. The Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots run together for election as one team,

*Or,*

- b. That they run for election separately in each community and then the winners of each community come together to form the Presidency?

*(0 to 10 scale, from '0 - Strongly prefer that they Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots run together as a team' to '10 - Strongly prefer that the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots run separately', NR = 99)*

**C5.** And if they do run together as one team, how much of a say do you believe each community should have in the election of such a presidential team? *(0 to 10 scale for each, from 0 - "Entirely Unacceptable" to 10 - "Absolutely Essential", NR = 99)*

1. The voting power to be in accordance with the population, i.e. about 75 – 80% for Greek Cypriots and 20 – 25% for Turkish Cypriots.
2. The voting power to be at a ratio of 60% for Greek Cypriots and 40% for Turkish Cypriots.
3. The voting power of the two communities to be equal, i.e. 50% for Greek Cypriots and 50% for Turkish Cypriots.

**C6.** More broadly, regarding the manner of election of federal officials, and as a matter of principle, would you say that you prefer –

- a. Mono-communal voting where each community elects its own representatives, thus motivating politicians to focus on satisfying all segments of their own community but not worrying so much about satisfying members of the other community,

*Or,*

- b. Cross voting, where each community primarily elects its own representatives but also has some say about who will be elected from the other community, thus motivating politicians to focus on satisfying major segments both of their own and of the other community, but not worrying so much about satisfying the more hard-line members of their own or of the other community.

*(0 to 10 scale, from 0 - 'Strongly prefer mono-communal voting' to 10 - 'Strongly prefer cross voting', NR = 99)*

**C7.** Another important matter related to the federal presidency is the manner in which decisions will be made. In this regard, how acceptable or unacceptable do you consider each of the following options? *(0 to 10 scale for each, from 0 - "Entirely Unacceptable" to 10 - "Absolutely Essential", NR = 99)*

1. All executive decisions will be made by simple majority in the council.
2. All executive decisions will be made by majority in the council, but within that supporting majority there must be at least minority support from the representatives of each community
3. All executive decisions will be made by majority in the council, but within that supporting majority there must be at least 50% support from the representatives of each community
4. All executive decisions will be made by majority in the council, but the President and Vice-President will each possess the right to veto any decision on behalf of their community.

**C8.** Finally in the dossier of Governance and Power Sharing, the issue of the distribution of competences has also been discussed a lot recently in the negotiations. The important matter that needs to be decided is which of the following competences will be administered by each community separately, and which will be administered by the two communities working together. *(0 to 10 response scale for each, from '0 – strongly prefer that my community separately manages its affairs on this issue', to '10 – Strongly prefer that the two communities work together on this issue', NR = 99)*

1. Foreign and EU Policy
2. Security and Defence
3. Supervision of the Banking Sector
4. Trade, Industry and Tourism Policy
5. Labour Policy and Social Security
6. Education Policy
7. Health Policy
8. Supervision of Cultural heritage
9. Environment, Energy and Natural Resources
10. Transport and Infrastructure
11. Citizenship, Human Rights and Immigration and Asylum
12. Supervision of the police



**C9.** More broadly on the issue of competences, and as a matter of principle, would you say that you prefer -

- a. A strong federal government, so that the emphasis is on inter-communal co-operation at the level of day-to-day decision making but running an increased risk of disagreements and difficulties in reaching decisions

*Or,*

- b. Strong constituent states, so that the emphasis is on separately managing day-to-day affairs and avoiding deadlocks in decision making, but running an increased risk of the two communities gradually moving away from each other.

*(0 to 10 scale, from 0 - 'Prefer a strong federal government' to 10 - 'Prefer strong constituent states', NR = 99)*

#### **D. Property Rights and Territorial Issues**

**D1.** Regarding the Property Issue, the most important decision to be made in the negotiations is whether particular properties will be returned - or restituted - to their pre 1963 / 1974 owners or whether instead their ownership will pass to the current user and the original owner will be compensated for the loss of his property. For each of the following categories of property, which types of resolution would you be willing to consider? *(Response options for each question are: 1-Such properties must definitely be returned to original owners, 2-It would be preferable if such properties were returned to original owners, 3-I am open to both alternative solutions for such properties, 4-It would be preferable if such properties remain with current users, 5-Such properties must definitely remain with current users, NR = 9)*

1. Currently unused properties
2. Properties where displaced persons from the other community currently live
3. Properties where immigrants from Turkey currently live
4. Properties which are currently used by nationals of other countries (e.g. from Britain, Germany, Israel etc), as residences or holiday homes
5. Properties that are currently used as factories, shops, or offices
6. Partly used properties, that are not currently vital either as residences or for income generation

7. Properties that used to be empty plots before 1963/1974 but now have homes or apartments built on them
8. Originally privately owned properties on which public utilities – airports, hospitals, universities etc. have in the meantime been constructed (e.g. Larnaca Airport in the south, Eastern Mediterranean University in the north).
9. Properties on which significant improvements have been made, to the extent that their value has been increased by more than 50%
10. Properties that host churches, mosques, cemeteries, and other such religious monuments (e.g. Orthodox churches in the north, mosques in the south)

**D2.** Regarding those properties which for whichever reason might not be returned to their original owners, how acceptable or unacceptable would you consider each of the following alternative forms of compensation? (0 to 10 scale for each, from 0 - “Entirely Unacceptable” to 10 - “Absolutely Essential”, NR = 99)

1. Original owners to be compensated with properties of equivalent value that are now in areas under the control of their own community
2. Original owners to be compensated with properties of equivalent value in the same town or village as their original property
3. Original owners to be invited to choose from a range of properties of equivalent value, anywhere in Cyprus
4. Original owners to be compensated with guaranteed bonds, which they will be able to redeem for cash at their expiration or alternatively sell the bonds in the free market whenever they wish
5. Original owners to be compensated in cash and without delay

**D3.** Regarding the Territorial aspect, how acceptable or unacceptable would you consider each of the following schemes for territorial adjustment? (0 to 10 scale for each, from 0 - “Entirely Unacceptable” to 10 - “Absolutely Essential”, NR = 99)

1. Varosha and Morphou to be returned under Greek Cypriot administration.
2. Varosha only to be returned under Greek Cypriot administration.

3. Varosha, Morphou and Karpasia Peninsula to be returned under Greek Cypriot administration.
4. Varosha and Morphou to be returned under Greek Cypriot administration, Karpasia Peninsula and Akamas Peninsula to both be converted into 'Federal Nature Preserves' under the direct administration of the federal government.
5. Varosha and Morphou to be returned under Greek Cypriot administration, Nicosia to be converted into a Federal Area under the direct administration of the federal government.
6. Varosha, Morphou and Nicosia to be converted into Federal Areas under the direct administration of the federal government.

*Notes to interviewer regarding question D3:*

- i. *In case the respondent is unfamiliar with any of the areas described, or is confused about what the proposal geographically entails, use the attached map to pinpoint the areas being described.*
- ii. *In case the respondent inquires about the meaning of 'Federal Areas', explain that "These will be areas where the Federal Government, comprised of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, will be exercising direct supervision, and where both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots will be living."*
- iii. *In case the respondent inquires about the meaning of 'Federal Nature Preserves', explain that "These will be areas where the Federal Government, comprised of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, will be exercising direct supervision and enforcing special regulations regarding nature conservation, and where both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots will be living."*

## **E. Citizenship and Residence Rights**

**E1.** Regarding the persons who have come to the north from Turkey since the events of 1974 – and also others who have come from non-EU third countries (e.g. from Russia, Lebanon, Pakistan etc.) and now live among Greek Cypriots – one important decision that will have to be made in the negotiations will be whether these persons can stay on in Cyprus after a settlement or not.

Specifically, the available options for such groups of people include, being allowed to stay with full citizenship rights, being allowed to stay with a residence permit and work permit but without being citizens, being asked to leave immediately, or being asked to leave after a transition period

of a few years. Which of these options would you find acceptable for each of the following groups? You may select as many options as you wish for each group. (*Response options for each question are: 1-Citizenship, 2-Residence Permit, 3-Immediate Departure, 4-Gradual Departure. Multiple responses to each question are permitted. NR = 9*)

1. Individuals who came to the north from Turkey but have married a Turkish Cypriot
2. Individuals who came to the north from Turkey, and have been in Cyprus for more than 10 years
3. Individuals who came to the north from Turkey and have been in Cyprus for less than 10 years
4. Children whose parents came to the north from Turkey but who were themselves born in Cyprus
5. Children who were born in Cyprus, but with one parent Turkish Cypriot and one parent who came from Turkey
6. Individuals who came to the south from a third country, but have married a Greek Cypriot
7. Individuals who came to the south from a third country, and have been in Cyprus for more than 10 years
8. Individuals who came to the south from a third country and have been in Cyprus for less than 10 years
9. Children whose parents came to the south from a third country but were themselves born in Cyprus
10. Children who were born in Cyprus, but with one parent Greek Cypriot and one parent who came from a third country

**E2.** Moving on to the issue of individual rights, for any Greek Cypriots who will choose to live in the north and any Turkish Cypriots who will choose to live in the south after a Settlement, one issue that has often been discussed is how such rights will be regulated. In this context, how acceptable or unacceptable do you consider each of the following options? (*0 to 10 scale for each, from 0 - "Entirely Unacceptable" to 10 - "Absolutely Essential", NR = 99*)

1. Such relocation would not be permitted: All Greek Cypriots would live in the south and all Turkish Cypriots would live in the north after a settlement

2. There would be a quota regulating resettlement village by village – so for instance in any specific village not more than one third of its residents can come from the other community
3. There would be an overall quota regulating resettlement for the constituent state – so for instance not more than one third of the residents in a whole constituent state can come from the other community - but individual villages may exceed that number
4. There would be a quota on how many from the other community can receive full voting rights in the constituent state, but the right to live and work anywhere in Cyprus would be exercised freely
5. There would not be any quotas or regulations, and individuals of both communities will be free to live, work and exercise voting rights wherever they wish on the island
6. There would be quotas and regulations in some regions of the island while in other regions there will be no quotas or regulations, depending on the social and other conditions that prevail locally.

**E3.** Looking more specifically at the types of rights that Turkish Cypriots would have in the south and Greek Cypriots would have in the north, how do you see the granting of each of the following rights? (0 to 10 scale for each, from 0 – ‘the granting of this right would make me very uncomfortable’, to 10 – ‘I consider the granting of this right absolutely essential’, NR = 99)

1. The right to move around freely and visit any part of Cyprus
2. The right to get a job
3. The right to receive public benefits
4. The right to start a business or buy an existing business
5. The right to purchase property
6. The right to receive education in one’s own mother tongue
7. The right to religious worship in accordance with one’s own creed
8. The right to vote in local municipal elections
9. The right to vote in Constituent State elections
10. The right to vote in Federal elections for the representatives of the Constituent State they live in.

## **F. A Future Referendum**

**F1.** Coming to the end of this survey, we would like to ask you to consider a hypothetical scenario where the negotiations between the two leaders conclude, a solution plan is drafted and a referendum is organised. In such a future referendum, how do you see yourself voting? (*NR = 9*)

1. I would certainly, or almost certainly, vote 'No'
2. I currently lean towards a 'No' vote, though I might at that time sway towards a 'Yes' vote
3. I am currently just as likely to vote 'Yes' as to vote 'No'
4. I currently lean towards a 'Yes' vote, though I might at that time sway towards a 'No' vote
5. I would certainly, or almost certainly, vote 'Yes'

***If response to F1 is 2, 3, 4 or 9, then ask F2 as follows:***

**F2.** And of the following possible factors, which do you think will most influence your decision to vote 'Yes' or 'No' at such a future referendum? (*Choose up to five options*)

1. The security and guarantees provisions of the plan
2. The property provisions of the plan
3. The territorial adjustment provisions of the plan
4. The governance and power sharing provisions of the plan
5. The economic provisions of the plan
6. The citizenship (i.e. regarding the settlers) provisions of the plan
7. The way the issue of bizonality and basic freedoms is approached in the plan
8. The way the issue of legal status and sovereignty is approached in the plan
9. Whether the other community has convinced me of their sincere intentions and their ability to work together with us
10. Whether Turkey / Greece has convinced me that it really intends to honor the agreement
11. The position that my close social or family circle will adopt vis-à-vis the Plan

12. The position that my political party will adopt vis-à-vis the Plan
13. The position that the President will adopt vis-à-vis the Plan
14. The position that the Greek / Turkish Government will adopt vis-à-vis the Plan (*note to translators: We mean here the position of the respective 'motherland': Greece for GCs, Turkey for TCs.*)

## **G. Demographics**

**G1.** Year of Birth

**G2.** Age Group

**G3.** Gender

**G4.** Place of Residence

**G5.** District

**G6.** Urban / Rural

**G7.** Level of Education

**G8.** Family Income

**G9.** Refugee Status

**G10.** Settler Status

**G11.** Profession

**G12.** Newspaper Readership

**G13.** Vote in 2004 referendum

**G14.** Vote in most recent parliamentary elections

**G15.** Projected vote 'if there were parliamentary elections tomorrow'

**G16.** Projected vote if there were presidential elections tomorrow, between Talat / Eroglu (TCs only), or projected vote in 2009 EU Parliament elections (GCs only)

**G17.** Interviewee Attention Span / Quality of Interview

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